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Figure 2: Global Risks Landscape 2012
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Figure 3: Global Risks Map 2012
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Across every sector of society, decision-
makers are struggling with the complexity 
and velocity of change in an increasingly
interdependent world. The context for
decision-making has evolved, and in many 
cases has been altered in revolutionary
ways. In the decade ahead, our lives will be
more intensely shaped by transformative
forces, including economic, environmental,
geopolitical, societal and technological
seismic shifts. The signals are already
apparent with the rebalancing of the global
economy, the presence of over seven billion
people and the societal and environmental 
challenges linked to both. The resulting
complexity threatens to overwhelm countries, 
companies, cultures and communities. 
We need to explore and develop new
conceptual models which address global
challenges. It is in this spirit that I present the
World Economic Forum’s Global Risks 2012
report. Now in its seventh edition, the report
features more refined risk descriptions and
rigorous data analysis covering 50 global
risks. It aims to improve public and private
sector efforts to map, monitor, manage
and mitigate global risks. It is also a “call to
action” for the international community to
improve current efforts at coordination and
collaboration, as none of the global risks
highlighted respects national boundaries.
This report captures the input of risk leaders
in thought and practice, including members
of the World Economic Forum’s Global
Agenda Councils. It is also underpinned by
the support and guidance of all the partners
of the Risk Response Network. Underlying
all these risks are velocity, multiplicity, and
interconnectivity – creating a global system
where mastering complexities will be the 
foremost challenge.
Preface The more complex the system, the greaterthe risk of systemic breakdown, but also
the greater the potential for opportunity.
Together, we have the foresight and
collaborative spirit to shape our global
future and particularly the survival instinct
to move from pure urgency-driven risk
management to more collaborative efforts
aimed at strengthening risk resilience to the
benefit of global society.
Klaus Schwab
Founder and Executive Chairman
World Economic Forum
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Foreword
The World Economic Forum’s Risk
Response Network (RRN) was launched 
to provide private and public sector
leaders with an independent, impartial 
platform to map, measure, monitor,
manage and mitigate global risks. Our
flagship research activity is this report.
Now in its seventh edition, the report’s
research methodology has been
significantly revamped. Data and analysis
are based on a newly designed survey
covering a meaningfully expanded set
of 50 global risks across five categories.
The assessments of these risks more
than doubled as a result of this year’s
survey, with 469 experts and industry
leaders responding worldwide. The 
survey captures the perceived impact
and likelihood for each risk over a 10-year
time horizon using  a clear and simple 
five-point scale to indicate  the severity of
impact, which provides a more intuitive
measure than the billions of US dollars
or hundreds of thousands of lives used
in previous years. All of the above was
achieved as a result of the unprecedented
support from the Forum’s Network of
Global Agenda Councils of over 1,000
renowned experts worldwide.
Readers will also see marked
improvements in data analysis and
visualization in this report.  A dynamic
assessment of each global risk will be
available via a new digital platform,
“Toplink.” It is a collaborative, intelligence-
sharing platform with a social media
interface and mobile applications for those
engaged in the RRN. The “risk radar” and
dynamic “risk barometer” are among the
innovative analytical and measurement
tools currently in development. Many of
these features are also available on the
Forum’s website.
An important aim of Global Risks 2012 is to
help decision-makers evaluate complex risk 
events and to respond proactively in times
of crisis – hence the inclusion this year of
a special report on the 11 March crisis in
Japan. Moreover, each of the three cases
in this report now feature key discussion
questions to contemplate in this regard. The
RRN will also focus on the three cases by
convening board members, risk executives
and policy-makers at the highest level at
Forum events throughout the year ahead, to
discuss resilient global risk management.
Looking beyond 2012, the Risk Response
Network will explore the global risks
highlighted in this report in their appropriate
regional, country or industry contexts
by launching task forces and initiatives
designed specifically for their mitigation. 
Many of these efforts will be driven by
an interdisciplinary and multistakeholder
community, the Network of Global Agenda
Councils, as they are the key experts
focusing on risk mitigation within the RRN.
We look forward to your comments and
feedback, as our aim is to enhance the
quality and impact of this report each
and every year as part of the Forum’s
commitment to improve the state of the
world.
Lee Howell
Managing Director
Risk Response Network
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Executive Summary
The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks 
2012 report is based on a survey of 469 
experts from industry, government, 
academia and civil society that examines 50 
global risks across five categories. 
The report emphasizes the singular effect of 
a particular constellation of global risks 
rather than focusing on a single existential 
risk. Three distinct constellations of risks that 
present a very serious threat to our future 
prosperity and security emerged from a 
review of this year’s set of risks.  
The three risk cases describe the links across a selection of the 
global risks, their interplay and how they are likely to develop over 
the next 10 years. The cases are initially based on a quantitative 
analysis of interconnections identified in the survey and then 
developed further via a qualitative analysis conducted through 
Forum workshops worldwide and follow-up discussions with 
project advisors. 
Case 1: Seeds of Dystopia 
Dystopia, the opposite of a utopia, describes a place where life is full 
of hardship and devoid of hope. Analysis of linkages across various 
global risks reveals a constellation of fiscal, demographic and 
societal risks signalling a dystopian future for much of humanity. The 
interplay among these risks could result in a world where a large 
youth population contends with chronic, high levels of 
unemployment, while concurrently, the largest population of retirees 
in history becomes dependent upon already heavily indebted 
governments. Both young and old could face an income gap, as 
well as a skills gap so wide as to threaten social and political 
stability.
This case underscores the danger that could arise if declining 
economic conditions jeopardize the social contracts between 
states and citizens. In the absence of viable alternatives, this could 
precipitate a downward spiral of the global economy fuelled by 
protectionism, nationalism and populism. 
Case 2: How Safe are our Safeguards?
As the world grows increasingly complex and interdependent, the 
capacity to manage the systems that underpin our prosperity and 
safety is diminishing. The constellation of risks arising from 
emerging technologies, financial interdependence, resource 
depletion and climate change exposes the weak and brittle nature 
of existing safeguards – the policies, norms, regulations or 
institutions which serve as a protective system. Our safeguards may 
no longer be fit to manage vital resources and ensure orderly 
markets and public safety.
 
The interdependence and complexity inherent in globalization 
require engaging a wider group of stakeholders to establish more 
adaptable safeguards which could improve effective and timely 
responses to emerging risks. 
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Case 3: The Dark Side of Connectivity
The impacts of crime, terrorism and war in the virtual world have yet
to equal that of the physical world, but there is fear that this could
change. Hyperconnectivity is a reality. With over five billion mobile
phones coupled with internet connectivity and cloud-based
applications, daily life is more vulnerable to cyber threats and digital
disruptions. The related constellation of global risks in this case
highlights that incentives are misaligned with respect to managing
this global challenge. Online security is now considered a public
good, implying an urgent need to encourage greater private sector
engagement to reduce the vulnerability of key information
technology systems.
While significant material and human resources were required in the
past to exercise political or economic influence on a global scale,
borders have become permeable as power shifts from the physical
to the virtual world. A healthy digital space is needed to ensure
stability in the world economy and balance of power.
Special Report: The Great East Japan
Earthquake
This section of the report features a special review of the important
lessons learned from the 2011 earthquake, tsunami and the
subsequent nuclear crisis at Fukushima, Japan. It focuses on the
role of leadership, challenges to effective communication in this
information age and resilient business models in response to crises
of unforeseen magnitude.
50 Global Risks
Structured on a 10-year outlook, the survey captured the perceived
impact, likelihood and interconnectedness of 50 prevalent global
risks. Figures 4 and 5 respectively show the average ratings of the
five risks which were assessed in this year’s survey as having the
highest perceived likelihood and potential impact over the next 10
years (see Appendix 2 for a full breakdown of survey responses).
Glossary
Five Risk Categories in the report: economic, environmental,
geopolitical, societal and technological.
Centres of Gravity are the risks of greatest systemic importance, as
identified by the Global Risks Survey.
Critical Connectors are risks connected to multiple Centres of
Gravity, and join the five centres of gravity into one coherent system.
In this report global risks are defined as having global geographic
scope, cross-industry relevance, uncertainty as to how and when
they will occur, and high levels of economic and/or social impact
requiring a multistakeholder response.
Weak Signals exhibit the weakest links to other risks and high
uncertainty in terms of variation in survey ratings of impact and
likelihood.
X Factors are emerging concerns of possible future importance and
with unknown consequences. Although they are not considered
among the global risks surveyed, they were submitted by experts
as issues to monitor in the future.
Figure 4: Top 5 in terms of  Likelihood
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Figure 5: Top 5 in terms of  Impact
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As explained in the section on methodology, the 2012 report
introduces the concept of Centres of Gravity – those risks perceived
by survey respondents to be of greatest systemic importance within
each of the five risk categories. For risk-related planning, Centres of
Gravity should serve as focal points to guide strategic interventions.
The 2012 Centres of Gravity are:
- Chronic fiscal imbalances (economic)
- Greenhouse gas emissions (environmental)
- Global governance failure (geopolitical)
- Unsustainable population growth (societal)
- Critical systems failure (technological)
The report also looks ahead to X Factors, which require further
research. The notion of a volcanic winter, epigenetics and mega-
accidents are some X factors for future consideration.
This report serves as the research base on which the Risk
Response Network works together on mapping, monitoring,
managing and mitigating global risks.
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Box 1: The Evolving Risk Landscape
The risk landscape in this 2012 report is based on a refined and expanded set of 50 risks, compared to 37 in previous years. This means
that comparisons to the 2011 report are not one-to-one. However, it is clear that respondents’ concern has shifted from environmental risks
in 2011 to socioeconomic risks in 2012, as shown in Box 1. Economic risks have displaced environmental risks as those considered most
likely. In 2011, the risks perceived as having the highest potential impact were economic and environmental; in 2012, they are economic and
societal.
12
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Methodology and Survey
Results
Figure 6: All 50 Risks Fall Near the High-Impact/
High-Likelihood End of the Scale
The seventh edition of the Global Risks
report is based on a revamped
methodology combining surveys,
workshops and interviews that engage
various stakeholders of the World Economic
Forum. The starting point is a set of 50
global risks – which are defined as having
global geographic scope, cross-industry
relevance, uncertainty as to how and when
they may occur, and high levels of economic
and/or social impact requiring a
multistakeholder approach to response.
They are divided into five categories:
economic, environmental, geopolitical,
societal and technological risks. The 2012
list was revised through workshops and
interviews with leading experts from the
World Economic Forum’s multistakeholder
communities.
The list was then assessed by a larger group of experts taking part
in the Global Risks Survey – 469 respondents gauged the likelihood
and potential impact of each of these risks over the next decade. As
shown in Figure 6, the majority of risks received an average score
located towards the high-impact and high-likelihood ends on the
1-5 scales, which validates the high concern about the 50 risks
identified.  
Likelihood
Im
p
ac
t
2 3 4 5
2
3
4
5
The survey respondents were also asked to identify five Centres of
Gravity – one per category – as the risks of greatest systemic
importance, or the most influential and consequential in relation to
others, as well as the risks that are most strongly connected to
them. The Global Risks Map 2012 in Figure 7 shows the entire
network of these interconnections between global risks.
From the Survey results, the most frequently chosen Centres of
Gravity are:
- Chronic fiscal imbalances (economic)
- Greenhouse gas emissions (environmental)
- Global governance failure (geopolitical)
- Unsustainable population growth (societal)
- Critical systems failure (technological)
The strongest connections to the five Centres of Gravity are
highlighted as the dark grey, star-shaped constellation to emphasize
their impact.
Source: World Economic Forum
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Figure 7: Global Risks Map 2012 (detailed)
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Analysis of the 2012 Global Risks Map reveals four risks as playing 
signiﬁcant roles in connecting the Centres of Gravity to each other. 
These four Critical Connectors, which link the main clusters of the 
system, are highlighted as black dots in the diagram. They are:
- Severe income disparity (economic)
- Major systemic ﬁnancial failure (economic)
- Unforeseen negative consequences of regulation (economic)
- Extreme volatility in energy and agriculture prices (economic)
Weak Signals are deﬁned as risks which are most loosely 
connected in the network, based on how many links they have and 
how often these were selected by survey respondents. The top ﬁve 
Weak Signals are:
- Vulnerability to geomagnetic storms (environmental)
- Proliferation of orbital debris (technological)
- Unintended consequences of nanotechnology (technological)
- Ineffective drug policies (societal)
- Militarization of space (geopolitical)
They have almost without exception received relatively low-impact 
and low-likelihood scores, and in most cases exhibit a signiﬁcant 
variation in how survey respondents perceive them, particularly 
among the different regions. Weak Signals will not be addressed 
explicitly in the cases considered in this report, though it is worth 
bearing in mind that some experts did rate their connectedness and 
severity more highly.
14
Source:  World Economic Forum
S
ection 1
S
ection 2
S
ection 3
S
ection 4
S
ection 5
15Global Risks 2012
Figure 8: Typology of Global Risks
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50 Global Risks
The typology of global risks, as summarized in Figure 8, enables a
more structured approach to the complexity of interconnections
than has been possible in previous reports.
The 2012 survey also revealed variations in the risk perceptions of
different groupings of survey respondents. Self-identified experts in
a category tended to perceive the likelihood and impact of a risk in
their area of expertise as higher than the rest of the survey sample.
One exception to this trend was the case of technological risks,
where experts often had a lower mean likelihood and impact score
when compared to other respondents. Appendix 2 identifies three
cases of significant differences in risk perception: first, between the
six regions (Asia, Europe, Latin America, Middle East/North Africa,
North America and Sub-Saharan Africa); second, between the
results of different occupational affiliations (academia, business,
government, international organizations, NGOs and others); and
third,  between self-identified subject area experts versus non-
experts.
The subsequent three cases help to explain some of the potential
causal relations that the survey data alone cannot substantiate and
to underscore the complexity of interconnected global risks that our
world faces in the next 10 years.
For more details on the five categories, Centres of Gravity and the
list of global risks, refer to Section 4, page 36.
For the full risk landscape, refer to Figure 2, page 5.
Source: World Economic Forum
S
ection 1
S
ection 2
S
ection 3
S
ection 4
S
ection 5
Global Risks 2012
Case 1: 
Seeds of Dystopia
The word “dystopia” describes what 
happens when attempts to build a better 
world unintentionally go wrong. This case 
considers how current fiscal and 
demographic trends could reverse the gains 
brought by globalization and prompt the 
emergence of a new class of critical fragile 
states – formerly wealthy countries that 
descend into lawlessness and unrest as 
they become unable to meet their social and 
fiscal obligations. Such states could be 
developed economies where citizens lament 
the loss of social entitlements, emerging 
economies that fail to provide opportunities 
for their young population or to redress rising 
inequalities, or least-developed economies 
where wealth and social gains are declining. 
This case shows that a society that 
continues to sow the seeds of dystopia – by 
failing to manage ageing populations, youth 
unemployment, rising inequalities and fiscal 
imbalances – can expect greater social 
unrest and instability in the years to come.
Risk Constellations and Potential 
Impacts
Two dominant issues of concern emerged from the Arab Spring, 
the “Occupy” movements worldwide and recent similar incidents of 
civil discontent: the growing frustration among citizens with the 
political and economic establishment, and the rapid public 
mobilization enabled by greater technological connectivity. A macro 
and longer-term interpretation of these events highlights the need to 
improve the management of global economic and demographic 
transformations that stand to increasingly define global social trends 
in the decade to come.
These trends are evolving differently across developed, emerging 
and least developed economies. In developed economies, such as 
those of Western Europe, North America and Japan, the social 
contract that has in recent decades been taken for granted is in 
danger of being destroyed. Workers nearing retirement fear 
cutbacks in social entitlements they have grown up to expect, such 
as state pensions, pre-established retirement age and guaranteed 
access to quality healthcare. 
Meanwhile, young adults in this same group of economies realize 
that they are part of a compressed labour force that is expected to 
support a growing population of elderly citizens, while bearing the 
brunt of austerity measures required to offset growing national 
debts. At the same time, these same youths must save enough to 
provide for their own old-age needs in the most challenging 
economic climate in a generation. Experts anticipate that high 
unemployment rates will increasingly co-exist with employers’ 
unmet demands for skilled labour – a sign that many young people 
may lack the skills needed to make the necessary economic and 
social contributions. 
In emerging economies, the context – and the challenge – is 
different. Countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Mexico, Peru and the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China), are racing to take advantage of a demographic window of 
opportunity presented by large labour forces with relatively few 
dependents, before this population also ages. These nations’ ability 
to seize the opportunity is far from guaranteed, given sluggish 
global growth and reduced demand from developed economies. 
Rapid economic growth in emerging economies has fuelled an 
impatient expectation that a rising tide will lift all boats, but social 
contracts may not be forged quickly enough to rectify increasingly 
visible economic inequalities and social inequities.
16
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Figure 9: Economic and Socio-political Change 
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Source: World Economic Forum analysis based on data from Freedom House, Freedom in the World: 2011 Survey Release (2011); and Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B. 
Penn World Table, Version 7.0 (May 2011) 
Failure to meet demands for civil and political rights could also have 
harmful consequences. Figure 9 shows that in most countries, 
improvements in economic living standards have been 
accompanied by increases in political and civil rights such as 
freedom of speech, assembly and belief. In approximately a dozen 
countries, citizens who have enjoyed rapid economic growth in the 
last 20 years have instead seen deterioration in their political and 
civil freedoms, often resulting in social unrest. A closer look reveals 
that many countries in this group share recent episodes of social 
unrest as a common characteristic. 
In the world’s poorest countries, rapidly increasing populations of 
young people, who are growing up in extremely vulnerable 
circumstances, are posing urgent demographic challenges. 
Least-developed economies and fragile states, such as
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Timor-Leste and many Sub-Saharan African
countries, are still struggling to ensure basic health and education 
for their growing populations and to take advantage of the wealth-
generating potential of women. 
The three distinct economic and demographic contexts described 
above are linked by migration. Across the globe, as population 
growth puts pressure on rural economies, people are being rapidly 
pulled into cities that struggle to absorb the new arrivals in an 
orderly way. Figure 10 shows that the rural population is expected to 
decline around 2023, while the urban population will continue to 
increase. Young people entering the urban labour force often ﬁnd 
that their education has not equipped them with the technological 
skills and entrepreneurial know-how to access employment 
opportunities presented by global connectivity. 
Figure 10: A More Populated and Urban World
2.5 bn
8.9 bn
1950 1975 2000 2025* 2050*
Urban population
Rural population
7 bn
*forecast
Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision Population Database. 
United Nations Population Division (2010)
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Origin Risk
Mismanaged demographic challenges:
age, population size and location.
Pathways
Overextended states unable to ease the pressures
of increasing competition for jobs, healthcare and
security exacerbate growing income disparity.
Manifestation
Dystopian scenarios of social unrest and retrenchment.
Cross-border migration adds a dynamic element to this
demographic picture. If managed well, labour can be mobilized
from one part of the world to another through legitimate channels
that match available skills to employer demands, while also
protecting the rights of migrants and their families. In the absence of
such channels, higher rates of irregular migration are likely, as is
abuse by illicit migration networks and smugglers. Cross-border
migration can therefore either be a remedy or a further
complication. In addition to irregular migration, experts express
greater concern about people who are unable to relocate
satisfactorily, grow frustrated and drop out of the formal labour
market where they reside.
This dynamic is summed up in Figure 11 with the potentially potent
combination of chronic labour market imbalances, chronic fiscal
imbalances and severe income disparity. When amplified by
extreme demographic pressures, these conditions could lead to a
retrenchment from globalization and the emergence of a new type
of critical fragile states – formerly wealthy countries that descend
into a spiral of decay as they become increasingly unable to meet
their social and fiscal obligations.
The signs already exist that the world is becoming more
fragmented, inconsistent and mistrustful; the question is the extent
to which these developments could lead to a global dystopia.
Figure 11: Seeds of Dystopia Constellation
Chronic fiscal imbalances
Chronic labour market imbalancesMismanaged
urbanization
Critical fragile states
Backlash against globalization
Mismanagement of
population aging
Unsustainable
population growth Severe income disparity
Trends and Uncertainties
Figure 12: Population Imbalances in 2025
Least Developed Economies Emerging Economies Developed Economies
100 years
50 years
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Source: Data from World Population Prospects: 2010 Revision. New York: United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010.
Population pyramids showing the percentage of the population
using 4-year age intervals
By 2050, the world will experience a near doubling of the urban
population to 6.2 billion – 70% of the projected world population of
8.9 billion. This means that we will have to build the same urban
capacity (housing, infrastructure and facilities) in the next 40 years
that we have built over the past 4,000 years.1 Meanwhile, the 
number of people globally over 60 years of age has risen from 8% in
1950 (roughly 200 million people) to 11% in 2009 (760 million
people), but is now projected to double in rate by 2050 (2 billion
people). Globally, the population of older people is growing at a rate
of 2.6% per year, considerably faster than the population as a whole.
This rate is projected to grow annually less than 1% over the next 10
years,2 and the trend is not confined to developed economies. The
percentage of people between the ages of 10 and 24 has already
begun to decline in many emerging countries.3 Figure 12 provides a
snapshot of the projected population age distributions in 2025.
Meeting social contracts for the youth and elderly depends on the
resumption of strong growth in the global economy, which shrank
by 2% in 2009. Within a two-year period following the liquidity crisis,
27 million people around the world lost their jobs; many more
accepted reduced working hours, wages and/or benefits.4 Young
people have been hit especially hard by the lack of career
opportunities – a trend that prompted the International Labour
Organization to warn of a “lost generation”. Since the onset of the
global recession, many countries have experienced increases in
rates of poverty, mental illness, substance abuse, suicide, divorce,
domestic violence and the abandonment, neglect and abuse of
children.5
On an unprecedented scale around the world, there is a sense of
receding hope for future prospects. Gallup polling data in 2011
reveal that, globally, people perceive their living standards to be
falling, and they express diminishing confidence in the ability of their
government to reverse this trend. Their discontent is exacerbated by
the starkness of income disparities: the poorest half of the global
population owns barely 1% of the global wealth, while the world’s
top 1% owns close to half of the world’s assets.6 Figure 13 provides
a global snapshot of inequality, while Figure 14 shows a rise in
inequality across many developed economies.
1 World Economic Forum. Outlook on the Global Agenda, 2011.
2 United Nations. World Economic Situation and Prospects 2010.
3 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: 2010
Revision. 2010. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
4 International Labour Organization. World of Work 2011. Geneva: International Labour Organization.
5 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. “The Global Social Crisis”, Report on  
the World Social Situation 2011. 
6 Credit Suisse. “Global Wealth Report”, Research Institute, 2011.
Source: World Economic Forum
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Gini coefficient
23 70.7
Figure 13: Income Inequality
Source: World Bank, Open Data, http://data.worldbank.org/
Figure 14: Incomes in Many Developed Economies are Less
Equal Than They Used to Be
Source: Growing Income Inequality In OECD Countries: What Drives It and How Can
Policy Table It? Paris: OECD, 2011.
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Equally striking contrasts are emerging within national borders; for
example, residents of Shanghai now live an average of 15 years
longer and earn US$ 20,000 per year more than their fellow Chinese
citizens in the inland province of Guizhou.7 Gross inequality is not a
new phenomenon, but the fact that this year’s survey respondents
selected severe income inequality as the most likely global risk to
manifest in the next 10 years suggests that concern about its
consequences is growing.
In developed countries, household and national debts compound
the challenge of providing for ageing populations. On average,
households in emerging economies owe 30% of their annual
income, while households in developed economies owe almost
150%, or 1.5 years, of their income.8 Shrinking tax revenues have
deteriorated the fiscal positions of governments and reduced their
ability to ease social hardship with welfare and counter-cyclical
spending.
While ageing populations and economic slowdown put pressure on
social contracts in advanced economies, in emerging economies
there is a growing demand to formalize social contracts. India’s
National Rural Employment Guarantees Act and Brazil’s Plano Brasil
Sem Miséria are examples of new government programmes that
aim to redistribute wealth and guarantee incomes in an effort to fight
poverty and inequality. However, like welfare systems in developed
economies, these programmes depend on continued growth and
expanding employment and are therefore vulnerable to economic
contraction.
In 2011, the World Economic Forum launched its quarterly Global
Confidence Index. The final results show that over half the
respondents remained pessimistic about the global economic
outlook; one in four said there is a lack of global leadership to deal
with global problems. A majority fear greater geopolitical as well as
societal upheaval in the years to come.9
7 “Gapminder”. Gapminder World, http://www.gapminder.org/, 2011.
8 Credit Suisse. “Global Wealth Report”, Research Institute, 2011.
Key Insights
General expectations about the potential of the world economy may
not be met due to the interplay between fiscal imbalances and
demographic trends. The resulting disappointment is amplified by a
growing sense that wealth and power are becoming more
entrenched in the hands of political and financial elites. Though rapid
urbanization offers economies of scale if infrastructure keeps pace,
it also makes the gulf in living standards between the rich and the
poor more immediately visible to more people – a trend which is
further amplified by the Internet.
When social mobility is widely perceived as attainable, income
disparity can spur people to reach for success. However, when
ambitious and industrious young people start to feel that, no matter
how hard they work, their prospects are constrained, then feelings
of powerlessness, disconnectedness and disengagement can take
root. The social unrest that occurred in 2011, from the United States
to the Middle East, demonstrated how governments everywhere
need to address the causes of discontent before it becomes a
violent, destabilizing force.
The world has at its disposal the human resources to manage its
ageing populations and to ensure that scores of youth do not feel
that the opportunities presented by economic growth are beyond
their reach. While the problems manifest themselves differently
across developed, emerging and least developed economies, the
experts contributing to this report suggest that their solutions may
be surprisingly similar: equip youths with the skills to succeed and
enable them to move to where their labour is most needed through
safe, well-managed migration channels.
Dangers arise, however, when the necessary leadership is not
forthcoming, and populations are not equipped with the skills to
adapt to new realities. As a result, a vicious cycle could take hold: as
tough times feed disillusionment, populations may retreat from
global connectedness, which in turn will limit the ability to arrest a
potential slide into dystopia.
Questions for Stakeholders
- How can countries collaborate more effectively to correct
chronic labour imbalances?
- What will social contracts be like in 2022? How can unemployed
workers be better trained for the skills required?
- What steps can be taken to reduce income disparity?
- What measures should be undertaken today to deal with the
changing socio-economic dynamics of an ageing population
and bulging young population?
- How can fostering entrepreneurship prevent the seeds of
dystopia from taking root?
9 According to the Global Confidence Index of the World Economic Forum, perspectives outside the
private sector were the most bearish, with almost 54% of the respondents indicating that they are
not confident in the state of the global economy. Just over 40% expressed little confidence in the
economy in 2012.
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Case 2:  
How Safe are our 
Safeguards?
Analysis of the Global Risks Survey revealed 
that the risk of unintended negative 
consequences of regulations was tightly 
connected with many other global risks. This 
indicates far-reaching weaknesses in 
regulations and suggests that we may be 
falling behind in our capacity to protect the 
systems that underpin growth and 
prosperity. For safeguards to strike the right 
balance – neither so lax they fail, nor so strict 
they carry harmful consequences – we need 
a more flexible, forward-looking approach. 
This applies to a diverse range of topics, 
such as global finance, transportation 
networks, emerging science and new 
technologies, scarce resources, the climate 
and biodiversity. Existing processes for 
setting regulations tend to focus on specific 
industries, sectors or actions, and are often 
over-complicated, inadequate, fragmented 
and slow to respond to the accelerating 
pace of global change. A shift in mentality is 
called for, so that policies, regulations or 
institutions can offer vital protection in a 
more agile and cohesive way.
Risk Constellations and Potential 
Impacts
On 14 April 2010, a cloud of volcanic ash spread from Iceland 
across the skies of Northern Europe. The grounding of thousands of 
flights was ordered by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) according to safeguards developed after the failure of some 
jet engines in the 1991 Pinatubo Volcanic Eruption. Initially, this was 
widely seen as a sensible precaution due to the lack of clarity on 
how great a risk the ash would pose to flight safety. After only a few 
days, with millions of people and goods left stranded, airlines and 
airports facing billions of dollars in losses and the Eyjafjallajökull 
volcano still spewing ash into the sky, the risk of resuming flights 
began to seem worth taking. Some airlines sent test flights into the 
cloud. As they returned without evidence of harm to their engines, 
an ad hoc process of relaxing the regulations began. 
In hindsight, it turned out that the regulations in this case had initially 
been overly strict. As a result, for a frustrating few days, many 
people were denied air travel. But, what was the alternative? What if 
no safeguards had existed, no flights been grounded, the risk had 
proved real and thousands of people had died as a result of multiple 
planes suffering engine failure? 10 
Beyond the immediate tragedy, the result could almost certainly 
have been a collapse in public trust in the safety of flying. In a bid to 
regain that trust, it is likely that regulators would have felt the need to 
define new standards that were unnecessarily strict, as the 
pendulum swings to overcompensate for the last acute shock. 
Global Risks 2012’s Special Report on Japan shows how a similar 
dynamic played out, as the Fukushima meltdown triggered global 
public anxiety about nuclear power. This event prompted German 
politicians to shut down eight of Germany’s 17 nuclear reactors 
immediately, with the remaining nine to be taken offline by 2022.
10 Alemanno, A. Governing Disasters. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011
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Ultimately, the effect of regulatory safeguards which are too lax or 
too strict becomes the same: the full beneﬁts of adequate industry 
regulation are undermined and not fully captured. In deﬁning 
safeguards, the challenge is to reach the right balance by weighing 
the consequences of catastrophe and the consequences of stiﬂing 
an industry’s development. 
Achieving a satisfactory balance is therefore becoming more and 
more challenging, as the systems on which the global economy
relies become increasingly interdependent and complex, with 
national regulations capable of having unintended repercussions 
globally. The problem of how much volcanic ash it takes to stall a jet 
engine is actually relatively straightforward for experts to determine. 
It is complicated, but not complex, as the ways in which ash can 
damage engines are well understood. By contrast, a deﬁning feature
of a complex system is that causal effects are nonlinear and virtually 
impossible to predict. Thus, for example, an earthquake that 
damaged a nuclear power plant in Japan impacted European 
energy policy. In another recent example, mortgage-backed 
securities originating in the United States crippled banks around the
world. 
Figure 16: Unsafe Safeguards Constellation 
Major systemic
ﬁnancial failure
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consequences of regulations
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Global governance failure
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cause unintended consequences.
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These can be exacerbate unmanageable risks. The 
interconnection between some are well known, for 
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Figure 15: How Safe are our Safeguards?
Source: World Economic Forum
2.50 
3.50 
4.50 
5.50 
20
11
-2
01
2 
20
10
-2
01
1 
20
09
-2
01
0 
20
08
-2
00
9 
20
07
-2
00
8 
20
06
-2
00
7 
20
05
-2
00
6 
Availability of latest technologies
Transparency of government policy-making
Ethical behavior of ﬁrms 
Quality of scientiﬁc research institutions
Public trust of politicians 
Data from the World Economic Forum’s annual Executive Opinions Survey 
corroborates ﬁndings of the Global Risks Survey.  This ﬁgure shows that, 
globally, the latest technologies are increasingly accessible to local 
industries, but indicators relating to conﬁdence in the institutions 
responsible for developing safeguards, including those that manage the 
risks of emerging technologies, have not shown proportionate increases.
Source: World Economic Forum
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Issues such as this typically focus on approaches to the types of
regulations. Discussions with the Forum’s community of experts
revealed that regulations are usually narrowly focused, tailored to
specific industries or activities, and aimed to prevent malicious acts,
accidents or disasters. The term “safeguards” is used to broaden
the scope of the regulatory debate and promote discussion from a
systems perspective. In an environment of increased
interdependencies, important “secondary” or “spillover” effects also
occur beyond any given initial activity, and these consequences
must also be monitored. Moreover, regulations themselves can
trigger unintended or unforeseen consequences. Despite greater
awareness about complex interdependencies, experts feel that
there is a growing gap between narrowly-focused regulation and
unaddressed diverse secondary system effects.
Analysis of the 2012 Global Risks Survey, as shown in Figure 16
revealed a deep concern about the consequences of getting the
balance wrong when defining safeguards for the systems on which
we depend. Unforeseen negative consequences of regulation
emerged as a Critical Connector – nominated by survey
respondents as the most important connection to a range of risks,
from fiscal imbalances and land and waterways mismanagement, to
greenhouse gas emissions and the trajectory of nanotechnology
and life sciences innovations.
The common thread linking all the safeguard issues, according to
experts, is that decision-makers need to devote more attention and
resources to defining the policies, norms, regulations and
institutions through which we manage them. While respondents
perceived unforeseen negative consequences of regulation as being
a lower-impact risk relative to others, analysis suggests it should be
acknowledged as a high-priority “origin” risk, owing to the dense
web of links connecting it to other global risks with catastrophic
impacts.
Trends and Uncertainties
Approaches that have previously been used to respond to risks are
becoming increasingly inadequate, given the complexity of systems.
Conventionally, nation states have adopted a “predict-and-control”
approach, which relies on tools such as regulations, incentives and
chains of command. Regulatory agencies often exercise a
precautionary approach by not approving specific activities in
situations where the threat is uncertain. When the potential benefits
from the activity are large, this practice may not provide the right
balanced approach if the smallest doubt exists on safety.11
The obvious limitations of the precautionary approach have led to
wider use of impact assessments, which weigh the costs, benefits
and risks of any proposed regulation through tools such as scenario
planning. However, the focus is usually on reducing the harms that
existing or proposed policies from one sector have on another
(transport or health for example), rather than focusing on building
the resilience of systems and monitoring emerging risks in general.12
More promising is the approach of “anticipatory governance.” In this
model, regulators accept the impossibility of anticipating the
potential trajectory of innovations based only on past experience.
They embrace the need for dynamic safeguards that can evolve with
the system they are safeguarding. Anticipatory governance implies
close, real-time monitoring in the direction in which innovations
evolve, and involves defining safeguards flexible enough to be
continually tightened or adapted in response to emerging risks and
opportunities. The model of anticipatory governance is attracting
attention in fields ranging from climate change to personalized
medicine.
Key Insights
To improve management of uncertainty in a complex world, it is
necessary to accept that we will not get safeguards right the first
time. Regulations have often been viewed as a way for authorities to
signal to the public that they are in control of a situation, but in a
complex system this control is often an illusion. While we should
start by considering counterfactuals in order to anticipate possible
outcomes of regulations, it is even more important to define broader
system safeguards. Such safeguards need to be flexible and
dynamic enough to adapt to changing information and should
closely involve stakeholders in the co-production of new types of
regulation.
The reaction to the volcanic ash cloud is one illustration of this:
although the ICAO faced harsh criticism from airline companies for
their slow response to new information, it took only a few days for an
iterative process of information exchange between the regulators
and the airlines conducting test flights for the regulations to be
amended. As new knowledge arrives, it becomes possible to
continually reassess the balance between the potential
consequences of catastrophe and the consequences of stifling a
beneficial activity.13 Such a dynamic process of iteration between
regulators and practitioners at the cutting edge of knowledge
exemplifies how safeguards should ideally be defined.
At the heart of this process is a necessary understanding of who
bears the risks and who reaps potential benefits, so that incentives
can be aligned in an appropriate manner. By their nature, the costs
involved in implementing safeguards, such as quality standards and
risk mitigation practices, may give some individuals, firms or
organizations reasons to lobby to minimize them and look for ways
around them. When losses can be passed onto others – as when
banks are defined as “too big to fail” – excessive risk-taking is likely
to occur. Conversely, when stakeholders recognize the importance
of having others adhere to safeguards to protect their own interests,
incentives are designed to entice everyone in the system to
cooperate. For example, because every plane crash undermines
public confidence in flying, firms in the industry are aligned to
support activities common to all airlines, such as baggage
inspection at airports. Studies show that in some cases the
adoption of practices by a subset can reach a tipping point whereby
firms all voluntarily adopt them.14
In defining regulations, it is necessary to avoid regulatory arbitrage.
Without global mechanisms to agree on safeguards, dangerously
lax ones, even in one jurisdiction, could trigger a global catastrophe
– for example, the creation and release of toxic nanoparticles.
However, the impossibility of predicting the effects of regulations in
complex systems also implies a need for an iterative and
incremental learning process. Such a process should exist among a
variety of local regulatory environments rather than within a rigid
global regulatory monoculture.
11 Meyer-Emerick, N. “Public Administration and the Life Sciences: Revisiting Biopolitics”.
Administration & Society, 2007, 38: 689-708. http://aas.sagepub.com/content/38/6/689.
12 For extensive examples of how impact assessments are being applied by the European health
sector to better manage risks whose determinants lie beyond the health sector’s jurisdiction, see
Wismar, M., Blau, J., Ernst, K. and Figueras, J. The Effectiveness of Health Impact Assessments.
World Health Organization, 2007
13 Alemanno, A. Governing Disasters. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011.
14 For a simulated example of this tipping point using airline industry data, see Heal, Geoffery G. and
Kunreuther, Howard H. “IDS Models of Airline Security”.  Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2005, 49:
201-217.
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There is, therefore, a need to find a balance that enables 
jurisdictions to learn from each other’s mistakes on a controlled 
scale – a balance that facilitates learning from trial and error but 
avoids a situation in which one error could be catastrophic. In 
striking this balance, it will be crucial for the various authorities 
defining safeguards to communicate closely, collaborate and share 
knowledge.
The pursuit of diverse approaches to safeguarding against the same 
or similar catastrophes or catastrophe-generating activities allows 
jurisdictions to learn from each other’s mistakes on a controlled 
scale. This approach offers an effective way to diversify regulatory 
risk and prevent regulatory imbalance in one regime from adversely 
affecting the system as a whole. Communication and collaboration 
are critical in the development of safeguards to ensure that 
knowledge is captured and shared with the global community. 
Defining safeguards to build the resilience of complex systems can 
begin by addressing “known unknowns” – those gaps in our 
knowledge of which we are aware. One way to do this is through 
creative processes and applied imagination. For example, the Risk 
Response Network is building an archive of “what if?” interviews 
that record hypothetical scenarios as imagined by global opinion 
leaders and experts to push the boundaries of our world view. 
 
Often there is consensus about what risks do exist, but decisive 
action is needed to design safeguards before the risks manifest 
themselves. For example, the World Economic Forum Annual 
Meeting in 2006 and Global Risks 2007 identified the factors 
underlying the subsequent global economic recession (see Box 2).
While rarely used in current regulatory models, complex systems 
theory has the potential to inform the dynamic development of 
safeguards by helping define mechanisms for detecting patterns in 
a system. It is also important to pay more attention to modelling the 
cognitive biases of leaders and the public, such as the tendency to 
overvalue recent experience. These biases are known to influence 
decision-making processes. Awareness-raising and training those 
responsible for defining safeguards would be a first step towards a 
flexible, systemic safeguard approach.
Box 2: From the Archives
Global Risks 2006: Complexity and Resilience, 
World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2006
The economic risks group’s biggest job was to “break through the 
complacency”, according to the presenter. Most members of the 
group felt pretty confident about the global economy, he said. And 
when part of the group considered some threat important, another 
countered that the solution was at hand. Nevertheless they came 
up with a list of concerns: 
1. Asset bubbles and the massive misallocation of capital (e.g., the 
US property market) 
2. Oil, the short term spike and possibly high or volatile prices in 
the long term 
3. A global current account imbalance 
4. China’s possible troubles in the banking system and geopolitical 
tensions 
5. A fiscal crisis in the industrialized countries 
While the risks might seem manageable when examined 
individually, they could be troublesome should they hit in tandem. “I 
can see combinations that could threaten globalization,” said one 
panellist. 
Questions for Stakeholders
- How can leaders break the pattern of crises followed by 
reactionary regulation and develop anticipatory and holistic 
approaches to system safeguards? 
- How can appropriate regulations be developed so that firms will 
undertake effective safeguards? 
- How can businesses and governments prevent a rapid 
breakdown in trust following the emergence of a new 
widespread risk? 
- How can business, government and civil society work together 
to improve resilience against unforeseen risks?
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Case 3:
The Dark Side of Connectivity
The critical infrastructure15 that underpins
our daily lives increasingly depends on
hyperconnected online systems. While
significant resources have historically been
needed to cause devastating consequences
for geopolitical or corporate powers, it is
increasingly possible for skilled individuals to
do so remotely and anonymously through
networked computer systems. As power
shifts from the physical to the virtual world, a
new paradigm for ensuring a healthy digital
space must emerge. This case highlights
the importance of redressing the misaligned
incentives which stand in the way of a
healthy future for critical information
infrastructures. Online security is a public
good, and new mechanisms are urgently
required to secure private investment in
exploring existing system vulnerabilities
before they can be exploited.
Risk Constellations and Potential
Impacts
In the last decade, the ubiquity of the Internet has transformed the
ways in which we conduct business, personal relationships and even
popular uprisings, as illustrated most recently by those in North Africa.
However, new ways of operating bring new kinds of vulnerability.
Today, there is a sense that we understand the benefits of the Internet
more fully than we understand the risks. Terrorism, crime and war in
the virtual world have, so far, been less deadly and disruptive than
their equivalents in the physical world, but there is a growing fear that
this could change. Will the dark side of connectivity become an
amplifying factor for traditional security risks in the next decade?
Views of experts are mixed. There is not much empirical evidence.
Research into cyber threats against governments and the private
sector has largely been funded by those who are in the business of
selling internet security solutions – a potential bias that causes
scepticism. Academic and policy papers are based largely on
anecdotal case studies. This report looks forward over a ten-year
horizon, and it is wise to bear in mind that much can change during
that time. Only 10 years ago, the dot-com bubble burst, and claims
about the Internet’s potentially transformative benefits seemed to have
been wildly overstated. We can now see that they were not so much
overstated as premature. It is worth considering whether the same
could prove to be true of current alerts about the Internet’s potentially
transformative risks.
Analysis of survey responses showed that critical systems failure was
rated as the Centre of Gravity in the technological category.
Respondents considered the risk that a single vulnerability could
trigger cascading failures of critical infrastructures and networks as
having relatively low likelihood but high impact. The risk that
respondents most frequently connected to critical systems failure was
cyber attacks. Clearly, concern over this issue is high; however, the
technological category was notably the only one in which experts
tended to give lower impact and likelihood assessments than the
non-technology respondents. This was reversed in the other four
categories, where experts tended to show more concern than the rest
of survey respondents (see Appendix 2 for more details). Figure 17
depicts a constellation of global risks related to cybercrime and
systems disruption that could amplify traditional security concerns,
such as the breakdown of diplomatic conflict resolution and terrorism.
This cascade could eventually undermine global governance.
Cyber threats come in three categories that are familiar to military15 Critical Infrastructure includes electricity, water, gas, transport, and information and
communications technologies.
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strategists and intelligence analysts: sabotage, espionage and
subversion. Examples are shown in Box 3. The real world16
16 Adapted from Greer, K. “Strategic Cyber Security”. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence, https://media.defcon.org/dc-19/presentations/Geers/DEFCON-19-Geers-Strategic-
Cyber-Security-WP.pdf, 2011
25Global Risks 2012
Figure 17: The Dark Side of Connectivity Constellation
Failure of diplomatic
conflict resolution
Global governance failure
Terrorism
Critical systems failure
Cyber attacks
Massive digital misinformation
Massive incident of
data fraud or theft
Origin Risk
Increasing capabilities for cyber crime and attacks.
Pathways
Balance-of-power tips as new actors can wage
effective interference and disrupt commerce.
Manifestation
The traditional system of global governance is
undermined.
Box 3: Objectives of Cyber Attacks
Sabotage
•	 Users may not realize when data has been maliciously,
surreptitiously modified and make decisions based on the
altered data. In the case of advanced military control systems,
effects could be catastrophic.
•	 National critical infrastructures are increasingly connected to
the Internet, often using bandwidth leased from private
companies, outside of government protection and oversight.
Espionage
•	 Sufficiently skilled hackers can steal vast quantities of
information remotely, including highly sensitive corporate,
political and military communications.
Subversion
•	 The Internet can spread false information as easily as true. This
can be achieved by hacking websites or by simply designing
misinformation that spreads virally.
•	 Denial-of-service attacks can prevent people from accessing
data, most commonly by using “botnets” to drown the target in
requests for data, which leaves no spare capacity to respond
to legitimate users.
Successful acts of sabotage require the greatest resources and
technical sophistication – so much so that most experts consider
them currently attainable only by highly organized and well-
resourced actors such as nation states. A recent example of cyber
sabotage is the Stuxnet virus, a malicious code that attacked a
specific piece of IT equipment – the Siemens controllers used in
nuclear facilities in Iran. Experts believe that the creation of Stuxnet
required a team of software developers and intimate knowledge of
the stringent security measures built into the target’s design and
operation.17
While evidence of the impacts of Stuxnet are questionable – it may
have delayed the Iranian nuclear programme’s development, which
is assumed to have been its goal – its broader significance lies in
suggesting what is possible. A virus like Stuxnet could conceivably
trigger a meltdown in a functioning nuclear power plant, turn off oil
and gas pipelines or change the chemical composition of tap water.
Cyber espionage also involves a relatively high level of technical
sophistication and is currently believed to be restricted to major
corporations, nation states and elite hackers. One example is
GhostNet, a cyber tool discovered in 2009 to have infected over a
thousand computers in ministries of foreign affairs, embassies,
international organizations, news media and non-governmental
organizations in 130 different countries. The virus could send
documents from infected hard drives back to its creator, record
keystrokes as users typed at the keyboard, and even covertly
activate the computer’s camera and microphone.
At the lowest end of the scale of technological sophistication is
subversion, which can severely damage reputations and undermine
trust. For example, in 2011 the US technology security firm HBGary
Federal – whose clients include the US Government and McAfee –
claimed to have information on the identities of a notorious group of
activist hackers, or “hacktivists”, known as Anonymous. In
response, Anonymous infiltrated HBGary’s servers, slandered them
on their own website, published 40,000 of the company’s private
emails, took down their phone system, took over their chief
executive officer’s Twitter account and posted his social security
number online.18  While this attack was motivated by revenge, the
motives for subversion can be as trivial as simple boredom.19
17 Rid, T. “Cyber War Will Not Take Place”. Journal of Strategic Studies, 2011, 1-28. http://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2011.608939http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/1
0.1080/01402390.2011.608939
18 Hactivism is a new way that the public can express discontent. 
As with traditional forms of demonstration, non-violent methods are preferred. 
This issue is explored further below.
19 “Cyber Security”. Financial Times. Special Report. 1 Nov 2011.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/3ea54958-041b-11e1-864e-00144feabdc0.pdf.
consequences of virtual world attacks can range from mundane petty
crime and mischief-making to shutting down critical systems, or even
potentially triggering physical armed warfare. Unlike traditional forms of
attack in the physical world, the motives and true goals of cyber
attacks – which can be carried out remotely and with near-
impenetrable anonymity – can be more difficult to analyse.
Source: World Economic Forum
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Experts believe that this kind of subversive attack – embarrassing
and inconvenient, but rarely life-threatening or catastrophic –
currently represents the limits of skilled individuals bearing a grudge.
However, barriers for committing more serious acts of espionage
and sabotage are lowering all the time. In November 2011, four
people were arrested in the Philippines in connection with the
hacking of several US telecommunications companies that resulted
in losses of US$ 2 million for AT&T alone, and these funds were
diverted from the phone companies to accounts of known terrorism
financiers.20 While many experts downplay concerns about “cyber
war” between geopolitical powers, others point to several states
that are known to be devoting significant resources to developing
cyber weapons and defences. In 10 years, Stuxnet and GhostNet
could look as crude and primitive as websites during the dot-com
bubble would look to us today.
20 Schwartz, M. “AT&T Hackers Have Terrorism Ties, Police Say”. Information Week, 28 Nov 2011.
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/attacks/232200252; Sengupta, S. “Phone
Hacking Tied to Terrorists”. The New York Times, 11 Nov 2011. http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/11/27/world/asia/4-in-philippines-accused-of-hacking-us-phones-to-aid-terrorists.
html.
21 “World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database 2010”. International Telecommunication
Union, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/world/world.html, 2011. 
22 Nagamine, K. “Worldwide Smartphone Market Expected to Grow 55% in 2011 and Approach
Shipments of One Billion in 2015”. International Data Corporation,
http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS22871611, 2011.
23 “The Internet of Things Backgrounder”. Intel, http://newsroom.intel.com/servlet/JiveServlet/
download/2297-5 5895/The%20Internet%20of%20Things%20Backgrounder.pdf, 2011. 
24 PricewaterhouseCoopers. Survey 2011.
25 Ibid.
Trends and Uncertainties
Figure 19: The Internet of Things
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Source: Gantz, J. “The Embedded Internet: Methodology and Findings”. IDC, http://
download.intel.com/embedded/15billion/applications/pdf/322202.pdf, 2009.
Figure 18: Increasing Connectivity, Internet Users Per 100
People
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Source: “World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database 2010”. Internatonal
Telecommunication Union, http://www.itu.int/ITU- D/ict/publications/world/world.html,
2011.
Individuals, businesses and nation states are depending more and
more heavily on data and systems in the virtual world. Thirty-five per
cent of the global population is online, up from 8% just 10 years ago
(see Figure 18).21 The way we connect is also changing: at the end
of 2011, about 470 million smartphones had been sold worldwide,
and the number is projected to double by 2015.22 Figure 18 shows
projected growth in connectivity of people through the Internet, but
perhaps the more significant shift lies in the rapid growth in “the
internet of things” – the high-speed communications network
composed of electronic devices rather than people (see Figure 19).
Currently there are five billion devices or “things” connected and
remotely accessible through the internet, from cars, kitchen ovens
and office copiers, to electrical grids, hospital beds, agricultural
irrigation systems and water station pumps. The number of devices
connected on the internet is expected to reach 31 billion in 2020.23
Many potential benefits are obvious. For example, smart meters
monitor use of domestic electricity consumption and feed this
information back to providers, who can use it to make management
of electricity supply significantly more efficient. The result saves
money and reduces greenhouse gas emissions. The downside is
that, once an information link is created between a user’s electricity
meter and the grid, there is a theoretical risk of a user being able to
hack into the grid via their meter and sabotage an area’s electricity
supply. Connectivity also allows for amplification; attacks that would
have been isolated incidents in the physical world can achieve a
cascading effect through connectivity.
Businesses are increasingly worried about targeted attacks which
aim to sabotage or steal data from their systems. These so-called
“advanced persistent threats” (APT) are driving corporate
information security spending globally.24 Companies are
increasingly aware of cyber threats but are not necessarily sure how
to address them. A recent study reported that companies feel both
more informed about cybercrimes, but less confident in their
existing cyber security measures than ever before.25
Reliable indicators of the financial impact of cyber attacks are hard
to come by. Most reports reference the same figures – those
26 First Annual Cost of Cyber Crime Study. July 2010. Ponemon Institute; Second Annual Cost of
Cyber Crime Study. Aug 2011.
27 Analysis from Marsh Inc.
28 Ibid.
26
provided by the Ponemon Institute26 – which estimated the cost of
crime for a sample of 50 large US companies would increase 44%
between 2010 and 2011. The median cost of those attacks was US$
5.9 million per year, an annual increase of 56%. Figure 20 suggests
that cyber risks constitute a significant threat to businesses, but more
information is needed to allow businesses to gauge the extent of the
risk since many remain un- or under-reported.
It is possible that the impact of cybercrimes on companies goes
under-reported, as victims prefer not to disclose that their systems
have been compromised. However, the fact that cybercrime is more
frequently in the news suggests this is changing. There is a growing
market for cyber risk insurance, covering risks ranging from computer
security liability to business interruption, cybercrime and cyber
extortion. The annual gross written premium for cyber risk-related
insurance is US$ 500 million, with the market so far mostly in the
United States.27 This is projected to grow over the next decade,
especially due to recent regulatory and legal changes. For example,
the US Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) guidance released in
October 2011 indicated that a computer breach should be viewed as a
potential material event requiring disclosure regardless of whether the
breach involved release of confidential data or not. The European
Union and Asia have begun to adopt similar breach notice laws.28
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Figure 20: Cost and Incidence of Cybercrime in the US
R
ep
o
rt
ed
 lo
ss
es
 d
ue
 t
o
 c
yb
er
cr
im
e
(U
S
$,
 m
ill
io
ns
) $600
500
400
300
200
100
0
N
um
b
er o
f cyb
ercrim
e cases
(tho
usand
s)
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
20022001 2005 20062003 2004 2007 2009 2010
n/a
2008
Number of cases (right axis)
Reported losses (left axis)
Note: Includes cybercrime complaints specifically referred to law enforcement
Source: PwC, 2011
Key Insights
A key challenge in minimizing the risks from the dark side of
connectivity is that incentives are misaligned. Vendors of online
security products have an interest in talking up the threats of
cybercrime, while victims of cybercrime often have an interest in
remaining silent. It is therefore very difficult for firms and
organizations to get a clear picture of the true levels of the risk and
needs for investment. Correcting such information asymmetries
should be at the centre of policies to improve global cyber security
and to ensure an efficient market.
Online security is also an example of a public good; costs are borne
privately, but benefits are shared. When individuals weigh the cost
of investing in antivirus software, they do not take into account the
benefits of protecting other users from spam and advanced
persistent threat attacks if their computers are infected with
malware. Firms have an incentive to invest in cyber security
measures that protect their own interests, rather than in those
measures that contribute to the health of the overarching critical
information infrastructure. Innovative multistakeholder collaboration
will be required to tip the balance towards investment in creating
systemic resilience.
Efforts to tackle the dark side of connectivity need to accept the
fundamental axioms noted in Box 4.29 There are no proven secure
systems, only systems whose faults have not yet been discovered,
so trying to overcome “hackability” may be as hopeless as denying
gravity. Instead, the goal should be finding ways for well-intentioned
individuals to identify those faults and deploy remedies to end-users
before would-be cyber criminals can discover and exploit them.
Experts believe that the levels of resource devoted to this effort are
nowhere near adequate, but there are signs that some industries
are taking cyber threats more seriously. In November 2011, 87
banks in England participated in a mock cyber attack “stress test”
in preparation for an anticipated increase in attacks during the 2012
Summer Olympic Games.30
Box 4: Axioms for the Cyber Age
Any device with software-defined behaviour can be tricked into
doing things its creators did not intend.
Any device connected to a network of any sort, in any way, can be
compromised by an external party. Many such compromises have
not yet been detected.
One example of an innovative market solution is Facebook’s “bug
bounty” initiative, which allows individuals who hack into
Facebook’s systems to report how they did so to the company and
receive a reward.31 Facebook’s strategy is controversial among
software developers and firms who see it as legitimizing efforts to
abuse proprietary software. However, without legitimate markets to
turn to, individuals who are skilled at discovering bugs in software
are drawn to the thriving black market in “zero-day exploits”, where
pieces of code that exploit vulnerabilities in software applications
can sell for hundreds of thousands of US dollars.
Understanding and working with human motives in this way is
essential to defining both challenges and successful solutions.
Many people who would be ashamed to admit stealing a DVD from
a shop will happily discuss illegally downloading a movie. We need
more research to understand why social norms that curtail actions
in the physical world may be less powerful in the virtual world, and
how to change this. A frank discussion is also needed on the rules
of acceptable engagement for corporate and industrial espionage,
especially where the line between private and public enterprise is
blurred. In addition, further dialogue could clarify the extent to which
“hacktivist” movements can be accommodated as a virtual
expression of legitimate civil disobedience.
Questions for Stakeholders
- What steps can be taken to improve the sharing of information
and to construct appropriate safeguards to reduce cyber
threats in the coming decade?
- What incentives will effectively mobilize businesses and the
public sector to invest in the resilience of critical information
infrastructures?
- How can we reconcile the potential benefits of innovations
created through open source software with the risk that some
individuals may manipulate the code for malicious purposes?
- Is online anonymity an integral aspect of freedom in a
hyperconnected world?
29 Adapted from Schneier, B. Secrets and Lies, 2000.
30 Evans, S. “UK banks stress test defences against cyber attack”. Computer Business Review, 23
Nov 2011. http://security.cbronline.com/news/uk-banks-stress-test-defences-against-cyber-
attack-231111.
31 Segall, L. “Facebook pays $40,000 to bug spotters”. CNN Money, 30 Aug 2011. http://money.
cnn.com/2011/08/30/technology/facebook_bug_bounty/index.htm. 
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Special 
Report: 
The Great 
East Japan 
Earthquake
At 14.46 on 11 March 2011, a 9.0-magnitude 
earthquake struck the Tohoku region of 
northeastern Japan and caused a tsunami 
that hit the country’s coastline within half an 
hour. Waves estimated as high as almost 40 
metres (roughly 16 storeys) inundated an 
area of more than 500 square kilometres, 
taking the lives of nearly 20,000 people, 
ruining the lives and livelihoods of thousands 
of others and destroying over 100,000 
buildings.32
32 “National Police Agency figure”. http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo.pdf, 2011.
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Figure 21: Resilience Built over Time: Disaster Prevention, Early Warning and Emergency Recovery Response (Extract)
Year
1891
1923
1978
1993
1995
Nobi earthquake
Great Kanto
earthquake
Miyagi
earthquake
Hokkaido Nansei-
oki earthquake
Hanshin Awaji 
earthquake
Dead/
missing
7,300
105,000
28
230
6,437
Lessons from the disaster
Government made aware of the
importance of earthquake measures
Buildings constructed using Western
methods collapsed; large-scale fires
from traditional wooden houses
Concrete apartment buildings thought
to be resistant collapsed
Tsunami arrived before the warning
system could function
98% of buildings that were destroyed
were built before the amended
construction law;
Local government functions disrupted:
– Prime Minister not notified for 2 hours
– Delayed response by firefighters
– Delay in identifying damage
– Donations insufficient for rebuilding
Policies introduced after the disaster
Disaster prevention investigation committee
established; research began into Western methods
for earthquake resistant construction
Revised town construction law, with anti-fire
planning codes and the world’s first earthquake
resistance regulations
Major revision of construction standards; new
design law aimed to ensure all new buildings can
withstand a seismic intensity 7* earthquake
Shortened forecast time from five minutes to three
minutes
Law enacted improving earthquake resistance
of existing structures.
Rapid top-down response enabled:
– Crisis centre established at the PM’s residence
– Law revised to expedite emergency response
– Better observation points to identify damage
– Government upped financial support for victims
Source: Global Agenda Council on Japan, 2011
* Seismic intensity 7 is based on the Japan Meteorological Agency’s Intensity Scale, which describes the degree of shaking at a point on the Earth’s surface. Unlike the Richter Scale the intensity of an
earthquake is not totally determined by its magnitude, and varies from place to place. The effect of an intensity 7 quake on people is described as: to be thrown by the shaking and impossible to move at
will, whereas in a 6 it becomes impossible to keep standing and to move without crawling.
The quake’s magnitude surprised even a country with a long his-
tory of earthquakes. Nonetheless, the extensive efforts made over
the years by the Japanese Government, businesses and popula-
tion to develop and strengthen the disaster prevention system
limited the death toll from the earthquake itself to under a thousand
(Figure 21).
Japan was not, however, prepared for a tsunami of such an
unprecedented scale. Over 90% of deaths were due to drowning
– with the elderly more than twice as likely to be caught unable to
evacuate in time. This fact contrasts with the 1995 Hanshin Awaji
earthquake, where 83% of deaths were due to collapsing houses
and fire.33 In particular, those responsible for defining safeguards at
the Fukushima nuclear plant had given forethought to the possibil-
ity of a tsunami, but with waves only a third the height. Although
the reactors themselves automatically stopped the moment the
earthquake struck, the cooling system and the backup power
generator failed after the plant was hit by the tsunami. The result-
ing meltdown of three nuclear reactors led to high radiation levels
which required the evacuation of more than 60,000 people.
Unforeseen Consequences Ripple
through Complex Global Systems
The meltdown at Fukushima reignited public debate about the
safety of nuclear power. Politicians in several countries responded
by dropping plans for new nuclear facilities. In Germany, for
instance, 200,000 citizens took to the streets to protest against
nuclear power, and the pro-nuclear party of Chancellor Angela
Merkel suffered heavy losses in local elections. In response, the
government announced the immediate decommissioning of the
country’s oldest nuclear plants, with the others to be phased out by
2022.
There was no credible suggestion that the decommissioned or
cancelled nuclear plants would have been unsafe, and the energy
they would have generated will now have to be generated by other
means – most likely involving the burning of gas, which is more
expensive and has a larger environmental impact. The fact that
inadequately defined safeguards at one outdated nuclear facility in
Japan can lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions and higher
energy prices in Germany suggests why analysis of survey
responses revealed unforeseen negative consequences of
regulation to be a Critical Connector.
30
33 Funabashi, Y., and Takenaka, H. “The Catastrophe and Comprehensively-Linked Crisis;”
Funabashi, Yoichi. “The Political Function: Post Mortem of a Crisis Governance”. Forthcoming.
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Figure 22: Risk Characteristics of the March 2011 Disaster in Japan
Source: World Economic Forum
34 Marsh Inc., estimation as of December 2, 2011, based on ongoing analysis of publicly available 
data to date.
The meltdown at Fukushima also challenges the relatively low 
priority assigned by survey respondents to interconnections 
between the risk of unprecedented geophysical destruction and
two Centres of Gravity: critical systems failure and global 
governance failure. While the connection between the latter two is 
perceived by the survey respondents to be strong, as shown in 
Figure 22, the March 2011 disaster in Japan suggests that survey
respondents may have underestimated the systemic relevance of 
geophysical destruction to these two risks. In particular, the 
breakdown of the coding system and back-up generator exposed a
weakness that could potentially be exploited by a cyber or a
physical attack. These risks are closely interconnected to critical 
systems failure, as explored in Case 3 – The Dark Side of 
Connectivity – in this report.
As emphasized throughout this report, the systems on which the 
global economy relies are increasingly complex and
interdependent. In such systems, the impact of a novel event is 
often difﬁcult to predict, and the effects of the tsunami stretched in 
unexpected directions. The direct impact of the damage incurred is 
estimated at 17 trillion yen (approximately US$ 220 billion, as of 
June 2011), in terms of destroyed buildings and infrastructure. The 
indirect cost is estimated to be between 35 and 60 trillion yen 
(approximately US$ 453 to 776 billion).34 Figure 23 illustrates how 
direct and indirect risks affected the Japanese economy. This 
analysis begs the question of who will and should pay for such a
historical catastrophe and what mechanisms need to be put in 
place to accelerate recovery time.
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Figure 23: Example of Business and Operational Risks and their Domino Effects
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Resiliency in Complex Systems May
Come from Redundancy
When employees and customers of car manufacturers in Detroit
saw news of the Japan tsunami, most would not have expected it to
affect them personally. However, it soon became apparent that
these manufacturers source parts from various companies, which
in turn source microchip controllers from a company called
Renesas. The plant where Renesas produces many of those chips,
north of Tokyo, had been heavily damaged by the earthquake. With
no alternative suppliers of automotive microcontroller chips, car
production temporarily shut down.
This was hardly an unprecedented experience. The 1999 Taiwan
Chi-Chi earthquake disrupted mobile phone manufacturers globally
by interrupting the supply of semiconductors, while the 2007
Niigata-Chuetsu-Oki earthquake shut down automobile production
across Japan by cutting off the supply of engine piston rings.35 The
danger is that such disruptions can be quickly forgotten as
companies revert to the principles of lean business models, which
imply that building redundancy and excess inventory into supply
chains are a waste of resources.
On the other hand, the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure
and Transport’s local liaison office has indicated that redundancy
can provide resilience in a crisis. The office has the flexibility to
mobilize trained personnel and necessary resources effectively and
in a timely manner. Employees of the office, which had been
restructured for greater efficiency, played a crucial role alongside
US military, Japanese Self Defence Force and other external aid
providers in accelerating the rescue effort by removing tsunami
debris from an airport runway and allowing relief planes to land.
The Development Bank of Japan became the first in the world to
offer more advantageous borrowing terms to companies that took
steps to increase resilience in case of an emergency. This policy
offers one indication that risk recognition may be improving. The
bank screens 18 metrics on business continuity, preparedness and
mitigation before deciding on loan premiums (see Figure 24).36
35 “2007 Niigata Chuetsu-Oki Japan Earthquake: Reconnaissance Report”. Global Risk Miyamoto,
http://www.grmcat.com/images/Niigata-Chuetsu-Oki-Japan-Report.pdf, 2007.
36 Takeuchi, Y. and Hiruma, Y. “Analysis of post 3.11 risk management and how to design a resilient
Japan - How should we manage tail risks”. 2011, and A Survey on the Disaster Preparedness and
Business Continuity of Companies in the Great East Japan Earthquake, September 2011. Japan:
Development Bank of Japan Inc (DBJ).
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Figure 24: Example of Organization Resilience Based on 18 Metrics
Source: Development Bank of Japan, 2011
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The Value of Adaptive Leadership
While businesses across Japan suffered terrible losses in the
aftermath of the tsunami, Lawson, a Japanese convenience store
chain, coped better than most. Within four days, its production lines
and logistics hub had recovered sufficiently to resume
approximately 80% of its business.
Lawson stores continued to serve their communities, make vital
supplies available and minimize financial losses to the company.
This response has been attributed to the networked managerial
structure put in place as a result of lessons learned from the 1995
Kobe earthquake disaster (see Figure 25). Each branch office was
required to assess emerging risks and draft detailed disaster
recovery plans twice a year; this will increase to three times a year in
2012. For example, bicycles were stationed in branch offices
because they were the only functional means of transport in the
1995 earthquake. It became mandatory to keep stocks of
emergency goods in branch offices, and the concentration of
distribution hubs was reassessed to allow for more effective
catering to disaster-struck evacuees. As the nature of crises can
never be fully anticipated, a network of employees who have access
to real-time coordinating mechanisms and the authority to make
decisions can be more valuable than teams of highly-trained,
specialized risk managers.37
The value of distributed leadership in an organization was also
demonstrated by the effective emergency response of the Joint
Task Force Tohoku. It was the first time Japan’s Self-Defence
Forces had ever operationally deployed a joint task force comprised
of ground, air and maritime units. The Joint Task Force Tohoku is
designed to operate with minimal central power, and its members
anticipate dealing with a nuclear crisis on this scale “without a plan,
strategy, training and intelligence”.38
Figure 25: Networked Organizations Fare Better in Sustained
Crisis
Source: Nohria, Nitin. “The Organization: Survival of the Adaptive”. Harvard Business
Review. http://hbr.org/web/2009/pandemic/survival-of-adaptive.
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38 Funabashi, Y., and Takenaka, H. “The Catastrophe and Comprehensively-Linked Crisis;”
Funabashi, Yoichi. “The Political Function: Post Mortem of a Crisis Governance”. Forthcoming.
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37 Nohria, N. “The Organization: Survival of the Adaptive”. Harvard Business Review, 2009.
http://hbr.org/web/2009/pandemic/survival-of-adaptive.
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Such decentralized organizations have been likened to a starfish – 
able to regenerate severed limbs – in their greater capacity to be 
resilient and competitive in a complex and uncertain world.39 In the 
starfish model of organization, leaders see one of their primary 
responsibilities as fostering a distributed capacity for leadership at 
all levels of their organization.40 The starfish model depends on 
context, however. In a large-scale disaster, there are limitations to 
the capacity of local personnel to deal with the crisis, and there is a 
need for a central agency to have an overview of information and 
the power to direct responses.41 
Advancing into the Information Space
As news channels around the world showed aerial shots of the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant spewing smoke, the people of 
Japan waited anxiously for an authoritative assessment of the 
current state of knowledge.
However, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco) had a 
reputation for being less than forthcoming in crisis situations, and 
as the hours passed without any such communication – neither to 
the prime minister’s office nor to the public – rumours filled the gap. 
On the fourth day of the crisis, when the United States advised its 
citizens to evacuate to 80 kilometres away from the Fukushima 
plant (four times the zone imposed by the Japanese Government), 
many Japanese felt this confirmed their suspicion that the situation 
was more serious than their leaders were prepared to admit.
Criticism of the crisis response, in terms of communications, 
exemplifies the “tyranny of the time line”. As recently as a decade 
ago, the media typically expected institutions with responsibility in 
crises to issue statements within the first 24 hours, giving them 
leeway to gather information internally before responding publicly. 
With social media tools such as Twitter and the ubiquity of smart 
phones, information – and misinformation – can now propagate at 
breakneck speed and the window of opportunity for authorities to 
enter and dominate the information space has shrunk to a matter of 
minutes.42
The reticence of Japanese leaders to disseminate information using 
digital media was understandable, as responding quickly carries 
inherent risks of being wrong, and they did not want to risk inciting 
panic and a chaotic exodus, especially from the Tokyo metropolitan 
area. However, the speculation that spread about the situation at 
Fukushima demonstrated how this reticence allowed rumours to 
take on the appearance of fact. This information gap made it more 
difficult for subsequent official explanations to displace rumours in 
the public consciousness. 
Trust in the integrity of leaders is no longer best maintained by 
remaining silent until all the facts are collated. Instead, the better 
course of action is to clarify quickly and honestly what is known 
and what is not, in a language and context that can be easily 
understood by the audiences, such as legislators, citizens and 
advocacy groups. In addition, the March 2011 disaster further 
highlighted the need for authoritative, insightful and scientific 
evidence-based communication by trusted experts at varying 
levels, starting at the top. For example, the UK Government Chief 
Scientific Adviser provided scientific advice to government during 
the 2009 swine flu outbreak and the 2010 volcanic ash incident, 
and it increased scientific capacity across Whitehall by encouraging 
all major departments of state to recruit a chief scientific adviser. 
While it is important to explain what has happened, the immediate 
focus of crisis communications must not be on apportioning blame 
but on what must be done to reduce harm and end the crisis.
The Skills of Leadership and Followership
The need for good leadership in a crisis situation is widely 
acknowledged. The response to the Great East Japan Earthquake 
also demonstrated the value of good “followership”.43 This involves 
the capacity to avoid two extreme forms of group behaviour – 
excessive conformity and excessive conflict – that can impede the 
capacity for effective crisis response.44 
Both excessive conformity and excessive conflict manifested in the 
March 2011 disaster. Japan’s traditional hierarchical structures 
exhibited excessive conformity, as they embodied the values of 
loyalty to the leader and preservation of unity. While this mind set is 
useful in routine work, it is less effective in crisis management, 
when uncomfortable truths may urgently need to be 
communicated.45 Trust in the system had been undermined by six 
changes of leadership in the last five years, and rather than 
restoring this trust during the disaster response, Prime Minister 
Kan’s newly established task forces blurred lines of communication 
from traditional hierarchical structures. Key personnel were 
overburdened with many meetings, and information from the 
ground did not always reach the Prime Minister’s office in a clear 
and timely manner.46 As one expert put it, there is a need to shift 
from the attitude of “see no evil, speak no evil, hear no evil” to “see 
well, speak frequently and listen attentively”.47 The lesson is that 
multi-layer networks need to be created ahead of time to enable 
trusted sources from the public and private sector to filter 
information upwards quickly and effectively in times of crisis.
Emerging lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake include: 
the importance of flexibility and resilience in response structures; 
the value of interoperability, as military cooperation made it easier 
to work jointly in the relief work; the benefits of systemic resilience 
that consider multiple hazards; the need to distribute responsibility 
across society rather than leaving it only with the public sector; and 
the value of understanding how man-made systems can amplify or 
minimize the risks of natural disasters.
39 Brafman, O., and Beckstrom, R. The Starfish and the Spider. New York: Penguin Group, 2007.
40 Nonaka, I. and Takeuchi, H. “The Big Idea: The Wise Leader”. Harvard Business Review, May 
2011. http://hbr.org/2011/05/the-big-idea-the-wise-leader/ar/1.
41 Funabashi, Y., and Takenaka, H. “The Catastrophe and Comprehensively-Linked Crisis;” 
Funabashi, Yoichi. “The Political Function: Post Mortem of a Crisis Governance”. Forthcoming.
42 Gowing, N. “‘Skyful of Lies’ and Black Swans: the New Tyranny of Shifting Information Power in 
43 Funabashi, Y., and Takenaka, H. “The Catastrophe and Comprehensively-Linked Crisis;” 
Funabashi, Yoichi. “The Political Function: Post Mortem of a Crisis Governance”. Forthcoming. 
44 Boin, A. The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
45 Funabashi, Y., and Takenaka, H. “The Catastrophe and Comprehensively-Linked Crisis;” 
Funabashi, Yoichi. “The Political Function: Post Mortem of a Crisis Governance”. Forthcoming. 
46 Ibid.
47 Takeuchi, Y. and Hiruma, Y. “Analysis of post 3.11 risk management and how to design a resilient 
Japan - How should we manage tail risks”. 2011, and A Survey on the Disaster Preparedness and 
Business Continuity of Companies in the Great East Japan Earthquake, September 2011. Japan: 
Development Bank of Japan Inc (DBJ).
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Questions for Stakeholders
- How can resilience, flexibility and interoperability be built into 
disaster response structures? 
- How can systemic resilience best be fostered by considering 
multiple hazards, especially in times of austerity?  
- How can responsibility in times of crisis be shared more fully by 
the private sector and society, rather than leaving it primarily 
with the public sector? 
- How can man-made systems be built to minimize rather than 
amplify the risks of natural disasters? 
- How can the right skills and leadership be nurtured to be more 
readily adapted to an evolving crisis situation?
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The Risk Categories
The 50 global risks in this report are divided
into five categories: economic,
environmental, geopolitical, societal and
technological.
 Economic
The economic category addresses those risks that are of greatest
concern in terms of likelihood and impact in areas covering a range
of macroeconomic concerns, from financial systems and
infrastructure to price volatility and regulation (see Figure 28 for the
full list of economic risks). Being in the forefront of public debate in
recent years, chronic fiscal imbalances and severe income disparity
emerged this year as the two most likely economic risks to manifest
in the coming 10 years. In addition, these two risks are rated as
having potentially high impact, along with extreme energy and
agriculture price volatility, as well as major systemic financial failure
(see Figure 26).
Responses to this year’s survey identified chronic fiscal imbalances
as the Centre of Gravity in the economic category (see Figure 27).
Chronic fiscal imbalances shares important interconnections with
risks from three categories, and it is most strongly associated with
the economic risk of major systemic financial failure – a risk that
captures the collapse of both major finance and banking
institutions, as well as currency regimes. As the Centre of Gravity in
the economic category, it follows that the topic of chronic fiscal
imbalances is linked to all four Critical Connectors. It is also strongly
associated with global governance failure, mismanagement of
population ageing and several geopolitical and societal risks, which
relate to the collapse of governments and international trade.
Interestingly, all four Critical Connectors are economic in nature,
which demonstrates that economic risks play a particularly
significant role in defining the level of resilience or instability within
the global risk system as a whole.
Source: World Economic Forum
Figure 26: Economic Risks
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Figure 27: Chronic Fiscal Imbalances is the Centre of Gravity in the Economic Category
Source:  World Economic Forum
Figure 28: Economic Risk Descriptions 
Source:  World Economic Forum
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Chronic ﬁscal imbalances Failure to redress excessive government debt obligations.
Chronic labour market imbalances A sustained high level of unemployment that is structural rather than cyclical in nature, coinciding with a 
rising skills gap and high underemployment, especially among youth populations.
Extreme volatility in energy and 
agriculture prices
Severe price ﬂuctuations make critical commodities unaffordable, slow growth, provoke public protest 
and increase geopolitical tension.
Hard landing of an emerging economy The abrupt slowdown of a critical emerging economy.
Major systemic ﬁnancial failure A ﬁnancial institution or currency regime of systemic importance collapses with implications throughout 
the global ﬁnancial system.
Prolonged infrastructure neglect Chronic failure to adequately invest in, upgrade and secure infrastructure networks.
Recurring liquidity crises Recurring shortages of ﬁnancial resources from banks and capital markets.
Severe income disparity Widening gaps between the richest and poorest citizens.
Unforeseen negative consequences of 
regulation
Regulations which do not achieve the desired effect, and instead negatively impact industry structures, 
capital ﬂows and market competition.
Unmanageable inﬂation  or deﬂation Failure to redress extreme rise or fall in the value of money relative to prices and wages.
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Environmental
The environmental category addresses environmental global risks 
of high concern, from natural disasters such as extreme weather 
and geomagnetic storms, to man-made disasters such as 
irremediable pollution and species overexploitation. If realized, these 
risks have the potential to destabilize both economies and societies, 
trigger geopolitical conﬂict and devastate the Earth’s vital resources 
and its inhabitants (see Figure 31 for the full list of environmental 
risks).
The two key pillars of climate change – continued rising greenhouse
gas emissions and the failure of climate change adaptation – top 
this category with the highest impact. Interestingly, survey
respondents collectively rated man-made risks, such as 
mismanaged urbanization, land and waterway use mismanagement
and species overexploitation, as more likely to occur in the next 10 
years than natural disasters such as earthquakes and volcanic 
eruptions (unprecedented geophysical destruction), persistent 
extreme weather and geomagnetic storms. 
The 2012 Global Risks Survey identiﬁed rising greenhouse gas 
emissions as the Centre of Gravity in the environmental category. 
Failure of climate change adaptation is the most strongly associated 
risk in this category and could rival rising greenhouse gas emissions 
as a Centre of Gravity (see Appendix 2). The environmental Centre
of Gravity shares direct connections to several risks in its own 
category and particularly to economic and societal risk categories, 
while the only geopolitical connection is the geopolitical Centre of 
Gravity – global governance failure. In addition, the risk of rising 
greenhouse gas emissions is highly connected to two Critical 
Connectors: unforeseen negative consequences of regulation and
extreme volatility in energy and agriculture prices. These 
connections highlight the systemic signiﬁcance of rising greenhouse
gas emissions through both its direct and indirect associations.
Source: World Economic Forum
Figure 29: Environmental Risks
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Figure 30: Rising Greenhouse Gas Emissions is the Centre of Gravity in the Environmental Category
Source:  World Economic Forum
Figure 31: Environmental Risk Descriptions
Source:  World Economic Forum
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Antibiotic-resistant bacteria Growing resistance of deadly bacteria to known antibiotics.
Failure of climate change adaptation Governments and business fail to enforce or enact effective measures to protect populations and 
transition businesses impacted by climate change.
Irremediable pollution Air, water or land permanently contaminated to a degree that threatens ecosystems, social stability, 
health outcomes and economic development.
Land and waterway use 
mismanagement
Deforestation, waterway diversion, mineral extraction and other environment modifying projects with 
devastating impacts on ecosystems and associated industries.
Mismanaged urbanization Poorly planned cities, urban sprawl and associated infrastructure that amplify drivers of environmental 
degradation and cope ineffectively with rural exodus.
Persistent extreme weather Increasing damage linked to greater concentration of property in risk zones, urbanization or increased 
frequency of extreme weather events.
Rising greenhouse gas emissions Governments, businesses and consumers fail to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and expand carbon 
sinks.
Species overexploitation Threat of irreversible biodiversity loss through species extinction or ecosystem collapse.
Unprecedented geophysical 
destruction
Geophysical disasters such as earthquakes and volcanic activity of unparalleled magnitude or 
unforeseen frequency that overwhelm existing precautions.
Vulnerability to geomagnetic storms Critical communication and navigation systems disabled by effects from colossal solar ﬂares.
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Geopolitical
The geopolitical category addresses risks that are of greatest
concern in the areas of politics, diplomacy, conflict, crime and
governance on a global scale. From diffusion of weapons of mass
destruction to pervasive entrenched corruption, geopolitical risks
are global risks of humanity’s own making. The threats of
geopolitical risks range from undermining socioeconomic progress
to annihilating society and earth’s resources (see Figure 34 for the
full list of geopolitical risks).
Global governance failure was ranked second in the highest impact
along with diffusion of weapons of mass destruction, but the former
is regarded as relatively more likely to occur in the next 10 years.
Pervasive entrenched corruption, critical fragile states, terrorism,
entrenched organized crime, failure of diplomatic conflict resolution
and widespread illicit trade were all rated a higher likelihood than
global governance failure; however, their perceived impacts are
lower. Most of these risks clustered around a likelihood of 3.5
(Figure 32). Militarization of space, similar to other space- and
frontier-science related risks in the technological category, appears
to be a relatively low concern of survey respondents looking ahead
to the next 10 years.
Responses to this year’s survey identified global governance failure
as the Centre of Gravity in the geopolitical category. Global
governance failure is the most interconnected of the 50 global risks
– it has a direct connection with 75% of the risks covered in this
report. This Centre of Gravity also shares important
interconnections with risks from all five categories, all four Critical
Connectors, as well as the Centres of Gravity in the economic,
environmental, societal and technological categories.
Compared to the other four Centres of Gravity, global governance
failure shares the highest number of very strong interconnections,
measured by the frequency with which survey respondents
selected that pairing of risks as systemically very important. This
underlines the weight of this Centre of Gravity’s influence over the
entire system, which is why it is centrally positioned in this year’s
Global Risks Map (Figure 3).
Source: World Economic Forum
Figure 32: Geopolitical Risks
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Figure 33: Global Governance Failure is the Centre of Gravity in the Geopolitical Category
Source:  World Economic Forum
Figure 34: Geopolitical Risk Descriptions
Source:  World Economic Forum
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Critical fragile states A weak state of high economic and geopolitical importance that faces strong likelihood of collapse.
Diffusion of weapons of mass 
destruction
The availability of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological technologies and materials leads to 
crises.
Entrenched organized crime Highly organized, disciplined and deep-rooted global networks, committing criminal offences.
Failure of diplomatic conﬂict resolution The escalation of international disputes into armed conﬂicts.
Global governance failure Weak or inadequate global institutions, agreements or networks, combined with competing national 
and political interests, impede attempts to cooperate on addressing global risks.
Militarization of space Targeting of commercial, civil and military space assets and related ground systems as core to defence 
strategy. 
Pervasive entrenched corruption The widespread and deep-rooted abuse of entrusted power for private gain. 
Terrorism Individuals or a non-state group successfully inﬂict large-scale human or material damage.
Unilateral resource nationalization Unilateral moves by states to ban exports of key commodities, stockpile reserves and expropriate 
natural resources.
Widespread illicit trade Unchecked spread of illegal trafﬁcking of goods and people throughout the global economy.
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Societal
The societal category addresses trends and uncertainties in
population dynamics, social stability and human survival. Global
risks in this category put into question the stability of modern
civilization and the continued well-being of populations (see Figure
37 for the full list of societal risks).
Figure 35 shows that from food and water shortage crises to rising
religious fanaticism, societal risks all have a relatively high likelihood
of occurring in the next 10 years. Water supply crisis has the highest
impact and highest likelihood, with food shortage crisis following
closely behind. The other seven risks in the societal category, as
well as the Centre of Gravity, cluster around an impact and
likelihood of 3 to 3.5, indicating that concerns for these risks are
equally high and that there is potential for far-reaching impact of all
of these risks on societies, communities and individuals.
Responses to the Global Risks Survey identified unsustainable
population growth as the Centre of Gravity in the societal category.
Unsustainable population growth shares important
interconnections with risks from all categories, with the exception of
technological risks. While the societal Centre of Gravity clusters
together with the majority of societal risks in likelihood and potential
impact, it is most strongly associated with food shortage crises. 
Along with water shortage, they both stand out from other societal
risks as having a relatively high likelihood and potential impact in the
next 10 years. Strongly connected to mismanaged urbanization and
severe income disparity, unsustainable population growth also
shares important direct connections to three Critical Connectors, as
well as the Centres of Gravity in the economic, environmental and
geopolitical categories. This positioning underscores its systemic
importance. Source: World Economic Forum
Figure 35: Societal Risks
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Figure 36: Unsustainable Population Growth is the Centre of Gravity in the Societal Category
Source:  World Economic Forum
Figure 37: Societal Risk Descriptions
Source:  World Economic Forum
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Backlash against globalization Resistance to further increased cross-border mobility of labour, goods and capital.
Food shortage crises Inadequate or unreliable access to appropriate quantities and quality of food and nutrition.
Ineffective drug policies Continued support for policies that do not abate illegal drug use but do embolden criminal 
organizations, stigmatize drug users and exhaust public resources.
Mismanagement of population aging Failure to address both the rising costs and social challenges associated with population aging.
Rising rates of chronic disease Increasing burden of illness and long-term costs of treatment threaten recent societal gains in life 
expectancy and quality.
Rising religious fanaticism Uncompromising sectarian views that polarize societies and exacerbate regional tensions.
Unmanaged migration Mass migration driven by resource scarcity, environmental degradation and lack of opportunity, security 
or social stability.
Unsustainable population growth Population size and its rate of growth create intense and rising pressure on resources, public 
institutions and social stability.
Vulnerability to pandemics Inadequate disease surveillance systems, failed international coordination and the lack of vaccine 
production capacity.
Water supply crises Decline in the quality and quantity of fresh water combine with increased competition among resource-
intensive systems, such as food and energy production.
S
ection 1
S
ection 2
S
ection 3
S
ection 4
S
ection 5
Global Risks 2012
Technological
The technological category addresses risks that are of greatest
concern in the area of current and emerging technology. Figure 38
shows a landscape of global technological risks as plotted by their
perceived likelihood and potential impact over the next 10 years.
Within the technology category, volatility and the inability to “know
the unknowns” are revealed by the large spread of impacts and
likelihood of the risks. Technological risks range from cyber attacks, 
highlighted as having the highest likelihood and a high impact, to
critical systems failure having the highest impact and lower
likelihood, and to the unintended consequences of nanotechnology, 
which has a lower impact and lower likelihood (see Figure 40 for the
full list of technological risks).
Of the 10 technological risks, critical systems failure was singled out
as the one risk that has the most important influence and
consequence and therefore, as the technological Centre of Gravity.
Critical systems failure shares important interconnections with risks
from all five categories. It is most strongly associated with cyber 
attacks and three economic risks: prolonged infrastructure neglect,
unforeseen negative consequences of regulation and major
systemic financial failure. 
The technological Centre of Gravity was identified as a key concern
for world leaders from government, business and civil society. It was
assessed by survey respondents as a relatively low likelihood, but
potentially high impact risk – a combination typical of events that
catch humanity off guard. Crucially, critical systems failure shares
important direct connections to all four Critical Connectors, as well
as the Centres of Gravity in the economic, environmental and
geopolitical categories. These linkages underline its position of
great systemic importance (see Figure 39). Source: World Economic Forum
Figure 38: Technological Risks
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Figure 39: Critical Systems Failure is the Centre of Gravity in the Technological Category
Source:  World Economic Forum
Figure 40: Technological Risk Descriptions 
Source:  World Economic Forum
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Critical systems failure Single-point system vulnerabilities trigger cascading failure of critical information infrastructure and 
networks.
Cyber attacks State-sponsored, state-affiliated, criminal or terrorist cyber attacks.
Failure of intellectual property regime Ineffective intellectual property protections undermine research and development, innovation and 
investment.
Massive digital misinformation Deliberately provocative, misleading or incomplete information disseminates rapidly and extensively 
with dangerous consequences.
Massive incident of data fraud/theft Criminal or wrongful exploitation of private data on an unprecedented scale.
Mineral resource supply vulnerability Growing dependence of industries on minerals that are not widely sourced with long extraction-to-
market time lag for new sources. 
Proliferation of orbital debris Rapidly accumulating debris in high-traffic geocentric orbits jeopardizes critical satellite infrastructure.
Unintended consequences of climate 
change mitigation
Attempts at geoengineering or renewable energy development result in new complex challenges.
Unintended consequences of 
nanotechnology
The manipulation of matter on an atomic and molecular level raises concerns on nanomaterial toxicity.
Unintended consequences of new life 
science technologies
Advances in genetics and synthetic biology produce unintended consequences, mishaps or are used 
as weapons.
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Box 5: X Factors
In a world of unknown unknowns and known unknowns, we are
constantly on the search to identify X factors – emerging concerns
of possible future importance and with unknown consequences.
Although they are not considered among the global risks surveyed,
they were submitted by experts as issues to monitor in the future. In
this year’s survey, a blank field was introduced in which
respondents could suggest risk concepts that are not covered in
the set of 50, but which they felt should be. Similar exercises in
out-of-the-box thinking have been carried out in workshops and
expert interviews. Below are some examples of note from this year’s
report.
Constant connectivity – Connectivity enabled by the Internet could
be changing our cognition in ways that are less suitable to deal with
complexity, uncertainty and sustainability.
Epigenetics – This emerging field studies inherited traits in humans
and other species derived from changes in the expression of
genetic code, rather than from changes to the genetic code itself.
New theories suggest that products and experiences can impact
human genetics in a previously unexpected way, which can
generate unforeseen risks. 
Financial illiteracy – This gap results in a lack of sufficient
understanding of finance, financial systems and services to a)
effectively regulate and monitor financial systems, b) sustainably
manage the finances of government and business, and c) effectively
manage personal finances to provide security and stability in old
age when state pension systems fail to provide.
Risks in Depth: Risk and Responsibility in
a Hyperconnected World Project
Throughout 2011, the Forum’s Information Technology Industry 
Partnerships and the Risk Response Network sponsored a 
multistakeholder project to identify and address emerging global 
systemic risks that arise from the increasing connectivity of people, 
processes and objects. Cyber security emerged as the key risk, 
and it encompasses a wide range of complex issues, ranging from 
behavioural to geopolitical in nature (see Figure 41).
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Source: World Economic Forum
Figure 41: Framework for Cyber Threats and Responses
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Mega-accidents – The accidental oil and chemical spills of the
future will be spills of genetically modified micro-organisms and
nano-scale materials, which overwhelm outmoded response
capacities with potentially devastating environmental and human
impacts.
Mis-education – Skills gaps and inequalities widen as people
continue to be educated for 20th century economies and labour
qualifications.
Mis-information – The gatekeepers of the broadcast news era are
gone, and the integrity and ethics of mass reporting online are
increasingly unknown.
Neotribalism – Polarized subcultures in the physical world create
borderless communities through the virtual space that can affect
political regimes in the real world.
Resource wars – Scarce natural resources, from oil to potable
water, could prompt violent conflict.
Volcanic winter – A level 7 or 8 eruption on the Volcanic Explosivity
Index, which alters the Earth’s atmospheric composition, could
cool the planet and, at the least, ruin several seasons of food
production. At worst, it could present an existential threat to
modern civilization.
This is further explored in the case on the Dark Side of Connectivity
in this report. Cyber security is not a problem that any one
organization, private or public, can solve alone, as many aspects
can be analysed in economic terms as negative externalities,
coordination failures or instances of game theory’s Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
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Risks in Depth: Supply Chain and
Transport Initiative
New Models for Addressing Supply Chain and Transport Risk
Over the last few decades many companies have sought to
optimize their supply chains by creating lean production and
distribution systems. These complex systems form the backbone of
trade and the global economy. While improvements to these
systems have generally increased efficiency, the growing complexity
and interdependence of these systems means that the cascading
consequences of major systemic disruptions can be increasingly
unpredictable and difficult to manage.
Recent examples of global disruptions that have tested the
robustness of supply chain and transport systems – and tolerance
of uncertainty by organizations – include the 2010 Icelandic volcano,
the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and the massive floods in
Thailand. Meanwhile, regional risks such as piracy in the Gulf of
Aden have gained global attention for their security implications.
Organizations are constantly assessing their own supply chains and
transport networks, as well as their capability to respond quickly to
unexpected disruptions. Most of these are managed at the local
level; however, the nature of global systemic disruptions means
there are limits to any one organization’s ability to fully address
vulnerabilities on its own. Better multistakeholder models are
required to plan for contingencies and build greater systemic
resilience that will insulate against shocks to the system, no matter
where they originate.
In particular, public-private engagement in collaborative risk
assessment, as well as greater sharing of data around threats and
vulnerabilities, could move the public policy conversation from
prescriptive regulatory approaches to a more focused collaboration
on solving for emerging threats and vulnerabilities. As discussed in
Case 2 – How Safe are our Safeguards? (page 20) – the concept of
“anticipatory governance” could be applied to challenges in
regulating global supply chains. This approach could avoid
repeating some of the unmanageable post-9/11 prescriptive
responses, such as 100% cargo inspection regimes.
In 2011, the World Economic Forum conducted multiple interviews
and surveyed a representative group of supply chain and transport
risk experts to identify the most significant global disruptions to
supply chain and transport networks. Disruptions included natural
disasters, conflict, political unrest and terrorism, along with the most
important global operational vulnerabilities that hinder response and
resilience.
By assessing the expert group’s views on the mitigation strategies
most likely to be effective in the future and most in need of
development, five priority mitigation areas were identified:
developing expert networks across business and government;
defining and measuring risk quantification to support effective
decision making; implementing effective legislation and incentives;
improving data and information sharing; and extending uses of
scenario planning (Figure 42).
Regional multistakeholder task forces could take collaborative
action regarding regional differences in risk exposure, economic
mix and regulation requirements. Such coordination could improve
the compatibility of risk management efforts, improve sharing of
response plans and intelligence, strengthen risk measurement and
understanding, and facilitate the development of mechanisms to
allow the movement of people and goods during a disruption –
particularly those most critically needed by society.
For additional information, see the Supply Chain and Transport Risk
Report and accompanying website: http://www.weforum.org/
content/pages/supply-chain-and-transport-risk-initiative.
Source: World Economic Forum
Figure 42:  Networks of Mitigation Strategies
Scenario planning
Shaping 
new legislation
Trusted networks across 
business and government
Data and
information sharing
Risk quantification
metrics
Initial insights highlighted that cyber security solutions exist, but
human behaviour is frequently a key weakness: while best practices
are led at the executive level, an understanding of the risk lies at the
board level. Providing executives with information and tools to
understand and mitigate the vulnerabilities within their organizations
presented itself as one way to create immediate impact.
In addition to improving the resilience of organizations, good “cyber
hygiene” simultaneously contributes to the security of the overall
environment. To reduce the overall levels of residual risk in the global
value chain, a critical mass needs to be achieved. As with
immunizing a population, 100% coverage is not required, but
immunization levels must be sufficient to isolate outbreaks and
disrupt the spread of disease. The Risk and Responsibility in a
Hyperconnected World project is developing tactics to move toward
this critical mass.
For additional information, see http://www.weforum.org/content/
pages/risk-and-responsibility-hyperconnected-world.  
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Further Action
The increasingly global environment makes 
it more important than ever for leaders and 
experts to put into place the fundamentals 
underpinning growth and development. 
The Global Risks 2012 report contributes 
to this process by bringing to attention 
and analysing the most current risks that 
leaders and experts believe are of highest 
concern now and for the next 10 years.
By offering policy-makers, business 
executives, academics and the public 
insights into the complexity and 
interconnections that underpin global 
risks today, the report raises awareness 
regarding areas that call for immediate 
action to ensure robust development 
and long-term wellbeing. It captures the 
perceptions of leading academics and a 
global network of Partner Institutes through 
surveys, workshops and interviews. 
This report sheds light on specific areas 
of concern or interest that could become 
future in-depth projects for investigation 
and analysis by the Risk Response 
Network with an interested organization.
The Risk Response Network 
The Risk Response Network was launched at the Annual Meeting 
in Davos in January 2011 to bring together private and public 
sector partners around risk issues of common concern, with the 
common goal of monitoring, mitigating, managing and measuring 
global risks. It is comprised of senior risk officers and leading 
experts on economic, geopolitical, environmental, societal and 
technological risks from:
–– Governments, international organizations and NGOs
–– Multinational corporations from all industrial sectors
–– Leading academic and research institutions
Further Steps
Data from World Economic Forum surveys, workshops, interviews 
and information provided by Forum Members make up a very 
important part of the Global Risks 2012 report. To ensure that this 
report continues to address the world’s risks, sharing of relevant 
data and information is of great importance. This includes sharing 
tools that create a robust platform from which the Risk Response 
Network, Forum Members and the world can manage and 
mitigate risks. 
Future surveys, workshops and interviews will be conducted to 
feed into the in-depth projects and Global Risks 2013 report. 
The Risk Response Network is also undertaking research and 
development on dynamic barometers that can gauge factors 
contributing to important global risks. 
“What If” Scenarios
The Risk Response Network also regularly conducts interviews 
with experts to uncover the risks appearing in their peripheral 
vision. These “What If” scenarios explore complex contingencies 
that could emerge outside the identified global risk landscape, as 
well as unexpected variations of identified global risks. To read a 
sample of interviews, visit http://www.weforum.org/WhatIf.
Further Information
Please refer to www.weforum.org/globalrisks2012 for more 
information online. 
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Conclusion
Over the past seven years this report has 
developed a methodology to improve the 
analysis of interconnected global risks 
– those which no single country, region, 
sector or industry is likely to be able to 
confront or prevent on their own.
The risk clusters highlighted in previous analyses – such as the 
water-food-energy nexus and the global illicit economy – will not 
disappear, but with each new year, risk perceptions can vary. In 
2012, concern about the growth prospects of the world economy 
is at the forefront of respondents’ concerns, and this subject 
pervades all three distinct, yet interconnected, cases presented in 
this report. Two risks that feature prominently in this year’s report 
– cybersecurity and demographic challenges – also emerged 
in Global Risks 2011 as risks to watch, while the governance 
of complex systems has been an underlying theme of previous 
reports.
Three common, crosscutting observations emerged from the varied 
groups of experts consulted to construct the three cases:
–– Decision-makers need to improve understanding of incentives 
that will improve collaboration in response to global risks
–– Trust, or lack of trust, is perceived to be a crucial factor in 
how risks may manifest themselves. In particular, this refers to 
confidence, or lack thereof, in leaders, in the systems which 
ensure public safety and in the tools of communication that are 
revolutionizing how we share and digest information 
–– Communication and information sharing on risks must 
be improved by introducing greater transparency about 
uncertainty and conveying it to the public in a meaningful way
The goal of this report is to inform and alert decision-makers on risk 
perceptions and emerging cases, as well as to illustrate – as in the 
Special Report on Japan – the compounding and unpredictable 
effects of risks in complex systems. 
The work of the World Economic Forum’s Risk Response Network 
throughout 2012 will be based on this report. The Forum is also 
exploring the development of a real-time risk barometer as a 
dynamic tool to track shifting perceptions of likelihood and impact 
of global risks. 
More information on these initiatives and other World Economic 
Forum activities on global risks can be found at  
www.weforum.org/globalrisks2012.
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Appendices
Academia, 139  (30%)
Business, 136 (29%)
Government, 31 (7%)
International
Organization, 42 (9%)
NGO, 81 (17%)
Other, 36 (8%)
NA, 4 (1%)
Appendix 1 - The Global Risks Survey
The annual Global Risks Survey collates the views of the World
Economic Forum’s multistakeholder network of the world’s leading
experts on global risks.
The 2012 Survey Questions
Question 1 – Risk likelihood in the next 10 years: “In your opinion,
how likely is each of the following global risks to occur over the next
10 years?” Survey respondents were asked to rate each of the 50
risks on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (almost certain).
Question 2 – Risk impact in the next 10 years: “If they were to
occur in the next 10 years, please provide your best estimate of the
total global impact that each of these risks would have.” (Impact
is to be interpreted in a broad sense, beyond just economic
consequences). Survey respondents were asked to rate each of
the 50 risks on a scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high).
Question 3 – Systemic risks: “Intuitively select a Centre of Gravity
– the most systemically important risk – for each category. Also
indicate, for each of these, what you feel the most important global
risk interconnection would be.”
Question 4 – Respondent information (voluntary): Respondents
were asked about their country of residence, the type of
organization they work for and their area of expertise.
Sample Description
The survey sample of 469 respondents encompasses a diverse
group of experts with the following backgrounds in Figure 43.
Figure 43: Breakdown of Survey Sample
Type of Organization
Region of Residence
Expertise
NB: Multiple selections were possible for the question on expertise
Source: World Economic Forum
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Appendix 2 – In-depth Survey Results
Variation
The primary statistics that were used in the report are the average
(mean) values of the likelihood and impact scores of each of the 50
global risks, as depicted in the risk landscape of Figure 2, where
they are used as the x- and y-coordinates for individual dots.
In addition to these averages, it is also instructive to look at the
variation of individual survey responses. Figure 44 depicts these
in the form of individual scatter plots – one for each risk – with
likelihood on the horizontal, and impact on the vertical axis. The
saturation of the colours of the “tiles” indicates how many people
have chosen that particular x-y combination. The darker the colour,
the more votes it received. In essence, the graph represents a two-
variable histogram, depicted from above.
The figure shows the wide distribution of responses over the scatter
plots; there are very few empty tiles. Those that have not been
chosen tend to be in the low-high and high-low regions. Generally,
Figure 44: Distribution of Survey Responses
Source: World Economic Forum
48 Baumgartner H, Steenkamp J-BEM. “Response Styles in Marketing Research: A Cross-National 
Investigation”. Journal of Marketing Research, 2001, 38: 143-156.
answers tend to cluster loosely along the diagonal connecting the
other two points: low impact-low likelihood and high impact-high
likelihood. Indeed, if responses for all risks are taken together, there
is a slight positive correlation between the two variables (with a
correlation coefficient of 0.39). One potential explanation is that
people generally worry more about an individual risk, without fully
disentangling its likelihood and impact.
Further, the modal tiles (the most common choices) are often – but
not always – located near the centre of the scatter plot. It is well
known that people tend to choose values in the middle of a range
when asked to rate a certain issue, unless they feel very strongly
about it.48 The so-called central-tendency bias offers a potential
explanation for this observation. However, for many risks, the mean
likelihood and impact scores fall above that central point (as shown
in the Global Risks Landscape 2012), which indicates that the
distributions display a negative skew.
To investigate this phenomenon, individual responses were
screened for instances where people chose similar values for all
risks, and only two such instances could be classified as such.
Thus, on the whole, the survey results are not heavily affected by
central-tendency bias.
These graphics are two-variable histograms, showing impact and likelihood. The darker the colour, the higher the concentration of votes.
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Just as there was variation around the likelihood and impact
scores, the responses to the question about the Centres of Gravity
also varied considerably. Figure 45 shows the frequency with which
the risks were chosen as Centres of Gravity. Within each of the
five categories, a single risk is clearly distinguished, and this factor
represents a Centre of Gravity throughout this report.
Figure 45: Survey Responses to the Question on Centres of Gravity
Source: World Economic Forum
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Figure 46: Comparisons between Regions
Source: World Economic Forum
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Differences between Sub-groups
This section explores linkages between the variations above and
the background of survey respondents.
By Region
Figure 46 shows one risk landscape scatter plot for each of the
geographical regions where survey respondents are located. For
example, Latin American and Sub-Saharan African respondents on
average assigned a higher impact to the global risks, while those
from the Middle East and North Africa chose lower likelihood and
impact scores.
Figure 47 shows a more detailed breakdown of the risks that
display statistically significant differences across regions. It
illustrates significant differences for less than half of the 50 global
risks. Among those, residents of Latin America and Sub-Saharan
Africa often provided higher average likelihood scores of pair-
wise comparisons. On the impact side, it seems that survey
participants from North America are often more concerned about
risks – especially some of the economic risks – than some of their
colleagues in other parts of the world. Within the societal category,
there is broad agreement across all regions on the risks, with the
exception of ineffective drug policies, which had significant
differences in both likelihood and impact. There seems to be a
greater perceived risk in Latin America, as compared with Asia
and Europe, for example. There were no significant differences in
perception on the technological category among respondents from
different regions.
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Figure 47: Comparisons between Regions 
   (only statistically significant differences are shown)49
Risk Likelihood Impact
Chronic fiscal imbalances Europe > Middle East/North Africa
North America > Asia
North America > Middle East/North Africa
Unforeseen negative consequences of regulation Sub-Saharan Africa > Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa > Latin America
Sub-Saharan Africa > Middle East/North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa > North America
Prolonged infrastructure neglect North America > Asia
North America > Europe
North America > Middle East/North Africa
North America > Sub-Saharan Africa
North America > Europe
Severe income disparity North America > Asia
North America > Europe
Unmanageable inflation or deflation Asia > Europe
Asia > North America
Sub-Saharan Africa > North America
Latin America > Europe
Hard landing of an emerging economy Middle East/North Africa > Asia
Middle East/North Africa > Europe
Major systemic financial failure Europe > Asia
Latin America > Asia
North America > Asia
Rising greenhouse gas emissions Europe > Asia
North America > Asia
North America > Europe
Failure of climate change adaptation North America > Asia
Mismanaged urbanization Latin America > North America
Land and waterway use mismanagement Latin America > North America
Vulnerability to geomagnetic storms Latin America > Middle East/North Africa
Ineffective drug policies Latin America > Asia
Latin America > Europe
North America > Europe
Latin America > Europe
Latin America > North America
Pervasive entrenched corruption North America > Asia
Failure of diplomatic conflict resolution North America > Asia
Entrenched organized crime North America > Asia Latin America > North America
Latin America > Asia
Latin America > Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa > North America
Widespread illicit trade North America > Asia Latin America > North America
Terrorism North America > Europe
Militarization of space Asia > Europe
Unilateral resource nationalization Sub-Saharan Africa > Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa > Middle East/North Africa
Diffusion of weapons of mass destruction Latin America > Asia
North America > Asia
49 With an analysis of variance (ANOVA), it was tested whether or not the means of 
the sub-groups are all equal. For those risks where they were not all equal, this was 
then followed by a Sidak post-hoc test to establish which of the pair-wise differences 
between groups are significant at the 5% level.
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Regional perspectives on the risks of greatest systemic importance
are largely similar. The most regional difference occurred in
the environmental category. Asian respondents saw the most
important systemic risk to be the failure to adapt to climate change,
while the Middle East and North Africa gave equal weight to
rising greenhouse gas emissions and failure to adapt to climate
change, and Sub-Saharan Africa viewed land and waterway use
mismanagement as the most systemically important risk.
Affiliation
Similar to the regional variation, there are some intriguing
differences between the occupational backgrounds of survey
participants. Figure 48 shows that on average, experts from
NGOs tend to assign larger impact and likelihood scores than
other groups. On the other hand, the average respondent from
government has a more benign view of the global risk landscape.
For each of the risks, the same tests as shown in Figure 47 were
performed to look at the exact pair-wise differences between sub-
groups and their statistical significance. The results are shown in
Figure 49.
Figure 48: Comparisons among Organizational Affiliations
Source: World Economic Forum
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In those cases where variation exists, it is – perhaps unsurprisingly
– often the people from NGOs who exhibit stronger assessments
than some of their peers, especially in the environmental category.
Also in several geopolitical risk categories, survey respondents
Risk Likelihood Impact
Unforeseen negative consequences of regulation Business > Academia
Severe income disparity NGO > Academia
NGO > Government
NGO > Government
Chronic labour market imbalances International Organization > Government International Organization > Government
Rising greenhouse gas emissions NGO > Government NGO > Business
Irremediable pollution NGO > Government
Persistent extreme weather NGO > Government
Failure to adapt to climate change Academia > Government
International Organization > Government
NGO > Government
NGO > Academia
NGO > Business
NGO > Government
Mismanaged urbanization NGO > Business
Other > Business
Unmanaged migration International Organization > Business
NGO > Business
Other > Business
Rising religious fanaticism Academia > Business
Ineffective drug policies Academia > Business
Other > Business
Pervasive entrenched corruption NGO > Business
Entrenched organized crime International Organization > Government International Organization > Business
Other > Business
Widespread illicit trade International Organization > Business
International Organization > Government
NGO > Government
Critical fragile states International Organization > Government
NGO > Government
Unintended consequences of nanotechnology NGO > Academia
Unintended consequences of climate change
mitigation
NGO > Business
Other > Business
Other > Government
affiliated with International Organizations have higher mean scores
than others. At the other end of the scale, individuals working in the
private sector and in government assessed many of the risks as
lower than others.
Figure 49: Comparisons between Organizational Affiliations
  (only statistically significant differences are shown)
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Figure 50: Comparisons between the Views of Subject-matter
   Experts and Their Peers
The perceptions of the most systemically important risks in
each category are largely aligned across different occupational
backgrounds. Exceptions include responses from International
Organizations affiliates, who often chose failure of climate
change adaptation as the environmental Centre of Gravity, and
mismanagement of population ageing as the societal Centre of
Gravity. NGOs have a different view in the economic category, and
predominantly see major systemic financial failure as the Centre of
Gravity.
By Subject-area Expertise
Lastly, we look at whether the expertise of survey respondents
influenced their assessment of the 50 global risks. Each respondent
was asked to identify one or more areas of their expertise in relation
to the five categories. Using this information, the risk landscapes
were broken down as shown in Figure 50. Experts in their respective
subjects tend to assign a higher impact and likelihood than their
peers who did not report themselves as experts in that category. The
category of technology was an exception to this trend: technology
experts tended to have a more benign view of the risks.
Figure 51 presents the results of the T-tests of mean comparison that
identified the risks where discrepancies are statistically significant.50
This analysis confirms the observations made from looking at the
scatter plots. Overall, there are very few global risks that experts
ranked with a lower mean score, and most of them came from the
technological category. Only in two cases were these significant: the
likelihood of unintended consequences of nanotechnology and
failure of intellectual property regime.
Figure 51: Comparisons between the Views of Subject-matter
   Experts and Their Peers
Risks where subject-matter experts gave a significantly higher rating in
terms of likelihood or impact than others are indicated with a (+), those
where the experts gave a lower rating with a (-).
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Source: World Economic Forum
Risks Likelihood Impact
Chronic fiscal imbalances + +
Extreme volatility in energy and agriculture prices +
Unforeseen negative consequences of regulations + +
Recurring liquidity crises + +
Chronic labour market imbalances + +
Major systemic financial failure +
Rising greenhouse gas emissions +
Failure of climate change adaptation +
Irremediable pollution +
Land and waterway use mismanagement +
Species overexploitation + +
Mismanaged urbanization + +
Unprecedented geophysical destruction +
Persistent extreme weather + +
Vulnerability to geomagnetic storms +
Mismanagement of population ageing + +
Unsustainable population growth +
Unmanaged migration +
Rising rates of chronic disease + +
Food shortage crises +
Ineffective drug policies +
Pervasive entrenched corruption +
Critical fragile states +
Global governance failure +
Failure of diplomatic conflict resolution +
Entrenched organized crime +
Widespread illicit trade +
Diffusion of weapons of mass destruction +
Militarization of space +
Unintended consequences of nanotechnology -
Proliferation of orbital debris +
Failure of intellectual property regime -
50 Alpha-level used: 5%. Mean differences and t-values for each of the risks are
available upon request.
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Further 
Reading
There were no differences in the choice of Centres of Gravity 
between subject-matter experts and their peers in other expert 
areas.
Box 6: How Confident Are We about the 
State of the World?
To answer this question, experts from academia, business, 
governments and NGOs are polled every quarter in a new joint 
initiative of the World Economic Forum’s Risk Response Network 
and Global Agenda Councils.
The Global Confidence Index – the only research initiative of its 
kind that targets over 1,000 international experts – asks survey 
participants about their confidence over the next 12 months on 
the state of the global economy, global governance and global 
cooperation. Respondents are also asked how likely they think 
economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological 
disruptions will be in the following 12 months. The data provides a 
dynamic assessment of which – if any – of the five categories may 
introduce a shock to the global system.
The first two surveys from 2011 have yielded interesting results. 
Experts remained pessimistic about the state of the global 
economy and global governance over the last two quarters, yet are 
more optimistic about the state of global cooperation to address 
these risks.
Over the longer term, the Global Confidence Index will produce 
time series data that compares changes of perceptions over 
several years, as well as regression analysis with other indicators. 
For more information please visit the Global Confidence Index 
website: http://www.weforum.org/ConfidenceIndex. 
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